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This thesis examines whether implementing a national voter registration list and a 
biometric identity verification program can prevent or mitigate voter fraud in an effort to 
protect the right to vote for U.S. citizens and increase election integrity. It analyzes the 
potential for, and scope of, fraudulent voting in the United States, purely from voter 
identity and eligibility verification vulnerabilities. The thesis exposes what policy and 
technical vulnerabilities exist within the various voter verification practices of the 
individual states that may permit the opportunity for fraudulent voting. It brings into 
focus the challenges of a federalist system on elections for national leaders. It investigates 
the effects voter fraud has on national elections, and ultimately, on democracy. This 
thesis studies whether the use of a national voter registration list and biometrics as secure 
and robust identity management solutions would address current and foreseeable voter 
eligibility related vulnerabilities. Lastly, it analyzes whether the solutions are adoptable, 
will minimize voter suppression while enhancing voter participation, and ultimately, 
increase integrity and confidence in national elections. 
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Americans have grown worried about systemic flaws in the U.S. election system.1 
These concerns stem primarily from numerous cyber attacks against the 2016 elections. 
Department of Justice Special Counsel Robert Mueller asserts the attacks were 
perpetrated by bad actors to gain information and conspire to defraud, thwart, disrupt, 
meddle, sow doubt and discord, and ultimately, interfere in the U.S. political and election 
processes.2  
Cyber attacks are not the only threat to elections.3 Voter fraud has been another 
prevalent topic in state and federal discussions and in mainstream media. The hacks and 
cyber attacks, along with contentious commentary on voter fraud by federal, state, and 
media outlets leave Americans feeling unsure about election integrity. 
The Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) ranks confidence in elections throughout the 
globe. According to EIP, the U.S. 2012 presidential and 2014 congressional elections 
were “ranked the worst of any established democracy, especially on campaign finance 
and electoral registration.”4 In 2016, the United States ranked much lower than many 
Western democracies including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Demark.5 
More recently, the United States dropped to 61 points, which placed it on equal footing 
with four third-world countries, none of which are liberal democracies.6 After the 2016 
elections, the Associated Press–National Opinion Research Center (AP-NORC) for 
                                                 
1 Pippa Norris et al., The Year in Elections, Mid-2016 Update (Sydney, Australia, University of 
Sydney: The Electoral Integrity Project, 2016), 4, 11, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58533f31be 
bafbe99c85dc9b/t/590ed0b7440243109d1f2b01/1494143171236/THE+YEAR+IN+ELECTIONS+UPDAT
E+2016+15+Sept+2016.pdf.  
2 David A. Graham, “What Mueller’s Indictment Reveals,” Atlantic, February 16, 2018, https://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/mueller-roadmap/553604/. 
3 Commission on Federal Election Reform, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections (Washington, DC: 
Center for Democracy and Election Administration, American University, 2005), 18, https://web.archive. 
org/web/20070609115256/http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf. 
4 Norris et al., The Year in Elections Mid-2016 Update, 11–12; Pippa Norris, Why American Elections 
are Flawed (And How to Fix Them), Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP 16-038 2016 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), 2016), 2. 
5 Norris et al., 5. 
6 Norris et al., 22. 
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Public Affairs Research found that only 40 percent of Americans had high confidence in 
election integrity.7 Due to these low ratings, legislatures and election officials have been 
looking for ways to bolster trust and participation in the system, but even suggested 
remedies are contentious.8  
A greatly debated topic is voter identification laws. Thirty-two states currently 
require or request voter identification on Election Day.9 Those who oppose identification 
laws say they disenfranchise minorities and alienate the poor.10 Those in favor of 
identification laws believe identity verification is needed to protect against fraudulent 
voting.11 Eric A. Fischer, R. Sam Garrett, and L. Paige Whitaker with the Congressional 
Research Service believe that most election stakeholders―citizens, as well as election 
and government officials―would probably agree that “all eligible voters should have an 
equal opportunity to cast a ballot” while all “steps are in place to protect the election 
process from fraud, abuse, and error at any stage.”12 Yet, the balance has been difficult to 
achieve. 
This thesis sought to answer the following questions: To what extent does the 
potential for voter eligibility fraud exist? Are ineligible individuals voting? If so, what 
implications does fraud have for the preservation of democracy? It also explored whether 
the use of a national voter registration database with a biometric program could better 
balance identity and eligibility verification and ensure that all eligible voters could vote 
and that those who are ineligible do not. It examined evidence of voter eligibility fraud, 
how election confidence is measured and why confidence is important, and how voter 
                                                 
7 Associated Press-NORC, Center for Public Affairs Research, Views on the American Election 
Process and Perceptions of Voter Fraud (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2016), 1, http://www.apnorc. 
org/PDFs/Fraud/Elections%20and%20Fraud%20Topline_FINAL.pdf. 
8 “Voter Identification Requirements|Voter ID Laws,” National Conference of State Legislatures, 
January 5, 2018, www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx. 
9 National Conference of State Legislatures. 
10 Frank Barry and Michael Newman, “Could Fingerprinting Finish the Debate Over Voter ID Laws?” 
Government Technology, January 30, 2015, http://www.govtech.com/opinion/Could-Fingerprinting-Finish-
the-Debate-Over-Voter-ID-Laws.html. 
11 Barry and Newman. 
12 Eric A. Fischer, R. Sam Garrett, and L. Paige Whitaker, State Voter Identification Requirements: 
Analysis, Legal Issues, and Policy Considerations, CRS Report No. R42806 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42806.pdf. 
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fraud plays into the health of a democratic system. The thesis also studied the role of 
federalism in elections, federal government involvement through laws and commissions, 
and the right of U.S. citizens to vote.  
The research deconstructed state voter verification practices and determined 
strengths and vulnerabilities within the processes. Millions of decentralized components 
make up the extremely complex U.S. election system. Some states have standardized 
processes within their jurisdictions, while others have given local election jurisdictions 
considerable independence and discretion.  
To understand the various state identity and eligibility verification processes 
better, 51 surveys were sent to each state and the District of Columbia’s senior election 
officials.13 The survey consisted of seven election process questions with multiple-choice 
answers, as well as areas for additional comments. Out of 51 requests, 24 states 
responded. Of those, 15 states require no proof of identification at the time of 
registration. Six states accept driver’s licenses as proof of eligibility. Regarding proof of 
citizenship, 18 states responded that they rely on affirmation only for citizenship and trust 
that the voter is truthful. Twenty-one states update their voter registration list 
continuously. Thirteen states offer mail-in registration or mail-in voting and check IDs 
prior to counting the vote. Eight states require voters to submit a copy of their IDs with 
their registration forms. Four states require voters to submit a copy of their IDs with their 
ballots. In New Jersey and West Virginia, no voter identification is required.  
When asked about voter fraud prosecutions, according to their responses, five 
states handle prosecutions at the county level only: Hawaii, Illinois, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Delaware handles prosecutions only at the state level, and 
West Virginia handles them at the state or federal level. Seven states prosecute at the 
county and state levels, and six states will consider prosecution at any of the levels: 
county, state, or federal. Importantly, it appears no state or federal requirement exists for 
state governments to reveal to the public any findings of ineligible voters on their voter 
                                                 
13 Note: names and addresses were gained from the National Association of State Election Directors. 
“National Association of State Election Directors Roster,” National Association of State Election Directors, 
October 4, 2017, http://www.nased.org/. 
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registration lists or ineligible voters who actually voted. This requirement applies for 
single instances or in reoccurring reports, as well as whether the incident was handled 
through prosecution or through civil remedy.  
The thesis goes on to deconstruct verification practices to negate or confirm the 
opportunity for ineligible individuals to be on the voter registration list and subsequent 
opportunity for fraudulent voting. It appears that states do not systematically verify 
citizenship from state or federal databases, and may not have the tools necessary to verify 
citizenship. Further, neither law nor procedure requires voters to show proof of U.S. 
citizenship to register or to vote in national elections. Substantial gaps occur between 
what the federal and state laws require (a voter in a general election must be a U.S. 
citizen) and verification that the law is being met.  
Registration problems and inaccurate lists can cause lost votes.14 According to a 
survey held by the California Institute of Technology/Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (CalTech/MIT) Voting Technology Project, the 2008 general election lost 
2.2 million votes due to registration problems.15 In February 2012, the PEW Charitable 
Trusts published research that found “one in eight state voter registration records is 
inaccurate, more than 1.8 million deceased voters are still on the rolls and approximately 
2.75 million voters are registered in more than one state.16 Voter registration issues are 
costly and potentially affect the outcome of an election. 
Finally, this thesis introduces two innovative solutions, including the use of a 
national voter registration database developed in a fashion similar to Canada, and the 
concept of embedding biometrics for reliable and efficient identity and eligibility 
verification purposes. These two solutions are working well in other nations. Canada 
                                                 
14 R. Michael Alvarez and Thad E. Hall, Resolving Voter Registration Problems: Making Registration 
Easier, Less Costly and More Accurate (Pasadena, CA/Cambridge, MA: Caltech/MIT Voting Technology 
Project, 2009), 4, https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/96618/wp_87.pdf;sequence=1.  
15 Alvarez and Hall, 4. 
16 Pew Center on the States, Inaccurate, Costly, and Inefficient: Evidence That America’s Voter 
Registration System Needs an Upgrade (Washington, DC: Pew Center on the States, 2012), 1, http://www. 
pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pewupgradingvoterregistrationpdf.pdf. NOTE: 
the Pew Center on the States commissioned RTI International, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institute, to 
assess the quality and accuracy of state voter registration lists in the United States using a database 
maintained by Catalist, LLC, a leading aggregator and processor of voter information. 
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credibly estimates it has saved more than $30 million Canadian dollars in each four-year 
election cycle since 2000, which equates to $22.5 million U.S. dollars based upon current 
exchange rates.17 Canada recouped its investment during the first election cycle that it 
used it.18 If these estimates are extrapolated with no variables other than the size of the 
population, the combined states could potentially save an estimated $200 million  
U.S. dollars during each general election cycle if they adopt a national voter registration 
system. The United States has the technological expertise to create tools to enhance 
integrity, protect privacy, promote transparency, increase confidence, and strengthen one 
of the most critical aspects of democracy: free and fair elections.  
This research closes with several key findings, including the discovery that voter 
fraud can exist due to established systemic vulnerabilities, ineligible voters may be 
voting, and, it is impossible to determine the pervasiveness of voter fraud based upon 
current tools and available data. To remedy the vulnerabilities, the thesis concludes by 
providing 10 policy recommendations for moving forward, including recommending 
states adopt a nationwide voter registration list as a viable aid for increasing integrity, 
leveraging from shared systems, and saving monies. These changes should be supported 
through federal legislation and managed by an appropriate agency. Additionally, it 
recommends election officials study the use of biometrics as a viable solution for voter 
verification to mitigate the need for voter identification at the polls, conceivably to pave 
the way forward for online voting. 
                                                 
17 Jennifer S. Rosenberg with Margaret Chen, Expanding Democracy: Voter Registration around the 
World (New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2009), 8, http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
legacy/publications/Expanding.Democracy.pdf. 
18 Rosenberg with Chen, 8. 
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I. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the months leading up to the 2016 U.S. general elections, experts, politicians, 
and Americans in general voiced concerns about systemic vulnerabilities.1 These 
concerns primarily stemmed from the aftermath of numerous hacks and cyber attacks 
against election system components. The attacks are still under investigation; however, a 
substantial indictment was unsealed on February 16, 2018.2 In this indictment, 
Department of Justice Special Counsel Robert Mueller asserts the 16 defendants 
(including three organizations and 16 individuals) coordinated attacks to gain information 
and conspire to defraud, thwart, disrupt, meddle, sow doubt and discord, and ultimately 
interfere in the U.S. political and election processes.3  
Cyber attacks are not the only threat to alter the outcome of an election.4 Voter 
fraud has been another prevalent topic and perceived threat in state and federal 
discussions, and in mainstream media. Voter fraud anxieties were heightened prior to the 
2016 elections, however, the roots of voter fraud concerns are almost as old as the system 
itself.  
Whether real or perceived vulnerabilities to elections exist, simple doubt in 
reliability and fairness may cause discord and diminish confidence in the voting system.5 
Speculation and sensationalism add fuel to the fire, and eventually, the legitimacy of the 
                                                 
1 Pippa Norris et al., The Year in Elections, Mid-2016 Update (Sydney, Australia: University of 
Sydney, The Electoral Integrity Project, 2016), 4, 11, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58533f31be 
bafbe99c85dc9b/t/590ed0b7440243109d1f2b01/1494143171236/THE+YEAR+IN+ELECTIONS+UPDAT
E+2016+15+Sept+2016.pdf.  
2 James B. Comey, Statement of James B. Comey, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the 
Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives for a Hearing concerning Oversight of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 28, 2016 (Washington, DC: Committee on the Judiciary, 
2016), 5, https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Director-Comey-Statement.pdf. 
3 David A. Graham, “What Mueller’s Indictment Reveals,” Atlantic, February 16, 2018, https://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/mueller-roadmap/553604/. 
4 Commission on Federal Election Reform, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections (Washington, DC: 
Center for Democracy and Election Administration, American University, 2005), 18, https://web.archive. 
org/web/20070609115256/http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf. 
5 Chuck Todd, Mark Murray, and Carrie Dann, “The FBI, the 2016 Election and the Confidence 
Deficit,” NBC News, November 1, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/fbi-2016-election-
confidence-deficit-n676171. 
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outcome may be challenged, especially if the election results are close.6 A prime example 
is the litigious 2000 Gore vs. Bush presidential election that was determined by a mere 
537 votes in Florida. The financial cost of that litigation was astronomical; the social cost 
might have been more. Never-ending recounts, vile allegations, constitutional challenges, 
and numerous lawsuits were the daily agenda until the Supreme Court made the decision 
to stop the recounts a month after the November 11 election.7 As a result, Bush became 
the 43rd President of the United States.8 The social and political response to the 2000 
election results are still disturbing; from the recount debacle, the federalism aspect, and 
the judiciary intrusion.  
As free and fair elections are a vital component of democracy, corruption of the 
process can spoil the trust and cause democratic erosion.9 Federal and state criminal 
statutes are in place to counter any manmade threats, including voter fraud. Every state 
has laws regarding voter eligibility and penalties against fraudulent voting. 
Unfortunately, prosecution or civil action happens after a crime has occurred and a vote 
has been counted, as the vote serves as evidence of the crime. If votes are fraudulently 
made, they can dilute the national democratic process.10  
Americans are losing faith in the election system. According to the internationally 
recognized Electoral Integrity Project (EIP), “The 2012 U.S. Presidential and 2014 
Congressional elections were ranked the worst of any established democracy, especially 
on campaign finance and electoral registration.”11 In 2016, survey statistics show that in 
                                                 
6 Commission on Federal Election Reform, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, 18. 
7 Charles L. Zeldon, Bush v. Gore: Exposing the Hidden Crisis in American Democracy (Lawrence, 
KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010), preface. 
8 Zeldon, preface. 
9 David C. Kimball, Chris T. Owens, and Katherine McAndrew Keeney, “Unrecorded Votes and 
Political Representation,” in Counting the Votes: Lessons from the 2000 Presidential Election in Florida, 
ed. Robert P. Watson (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2004), 1; Philippe C. Schmitter and 
Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy is…and is Not,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 3 (Summer 1991):78; 
Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 2 (April 1998): 97, 
Project Muse. 
10 Kimball, Owens, and Keeney, 1; Schmitter and Karl, “78; Schedler, “97. 
11 Norris et al., The Year in Elections Mid-2016 Update, 11–12; Pippa Norris, Why American 
Elections are Flawed (And How to Fix Them), Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP 16-038 2016 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), 2016), 2. 
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comparison with all 153 nations in the survey, the United States, again, ranked poorly. 
The United States was graded much lower than the majority of Western 
democracies―just 62 out of the 100 points on the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) 
Index as compared with the United Kingdom at 65, Australia at 70, Canada at 75, and 
Demark at 86.12  
More recently, in the EIP 2017 midyear report, the United States dropped another 
perception point to 61 points. This number placed the nation on equal footing with Oman, 
Bhutan, Timor-Leste, and Panama, none of which are liberal democracies.13 The United 
States received its lowest scoring in the matters of electoral laws, district boundaries, and 
voter registration. The United Kingdom ranked at 66, while Australia, Canada, and 
Demark all remained the same.14  
Other survey companies found similar responses. Prior to the 2016 elections, 
Gallup found that only 60 percent of Americans were confident their votes would 
count.15 After the 2016 elections, the Associated Press–National Opinion Research 
Center (AP-NORC) for Public Affairs Research found that only about 40 percent of 
Americans had high confidence in election integrity.16 Voter confidence gauged by 
surveys is likely not the best measuring stick on how elections are performing.17 Voters 
may be influenced by convenience at the polling sites or whether their candidate wins as 
to whether they are confident with the current state of elections.18 Voter confidence, 
however, likely affects voter turnout and officials should be paying attention. 
                                                 
12 Norris et al., The Year in Elections Mid-2016 Update, 5. 
13 Pippa Norris et al., The Year in Elections, 2017 Mid-Year Update (Sydney, Australia: University of 
Sydney, The Electoral Integrity Project, 2016), 22. 
14 Norris et al., 21. 
15 Justin McCarthy, “Gallup Polls: About Six in 10 Confident in Accuracy of U.S. Vote Count,” 
Gallup News, September 9, 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/195371/six-confident-accuracy-vote-
count.aspx?g_source=Politics&g_medium=newsfeed&g_campaign=tiles. 
16 Associated Press-NORC, Center for Public Affairs Research, Views on the American Election 
Process and Perceptions of Voter Fraud (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2016), 1, http://www.apnorc. 
org/PDFs/Fraud/Elections%20and%20Fraud%20Topline_FINAL.pdf. 
17 Charles S. Stewart III, “Thoughts on Voter Confidence and Election Reform,” Election Updates 




Legislatures and election officials have been looking for effective ways to bolster 
trust and participation in the system, but even new methods can be contentious. 
According to the U.S. Constitution, election administration is the responsibility of the 
individual states.19 Since each state chooses its method for voter identification and 
vetting, processes differ across the United States.20 Thirty-two states currently require or 
request voter identification on Election Day.21 Two more states, West Virginia and Iowa, 
enacted voter identification laws that go into effect in 2018.22 Identification requirements 
at the polling sites are quarrelsome.  
In 2015, the University of California, San Diego found “strict photo identification 
laws have a differentially negative impact on the turnout of Hispanics, Blacks, and 
mixed-race Americans in primaries and general elections.”23 Opponents to identification 
laws believe identification cards are costly, require taking time off work, and are a burden 
for travel to a county or state government office, which causes inconvenience.24 Those 
who oppose identification laws say they disenfranchise minorities and alienate the poor.25 
Those in favor of identification laws believe identity verification is needed to protect 
against fraudulent voting.26 Striking a balance, however, has been difficult to achieve. 
Most election stakeholders―citizens, as well as election and government 
officials―would probably come to an agreement that:  
 All eligible voters should have an equal opportunity to cast a ballot. 
                                                 
19 U.S. Const. amend. X. Sec. 2.  
20 Note: Throughout this paper, the word “states” includes “states and the District of Columbia” in 
relation to election jurisdictions. 
21 “Voter Identification Requirements|Voter ID Laws,” National Conference of State Legislatures, 
January 5, 2018, www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx. 
22 National Conference of State Legislatures. 
23 Vann R. Newkirk, “How Voter ID Laws Discriminate,” The Atlantic, February 18, 2017, https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/how-voter-id-laws-discriminate-study/517218/. 
24 Newkirk. 
25 Frank Barry and Michael Newman, “Could Fingerprinting Finish the Debate Over Voter ID Laws?” 
Government Technology, January 30, 2015, http://www.govtech.com/opinion/Could-Fingerprinting-Finish-
the-Debate-Over-Voter-ID-Laws.html. 
26 Barry and Newman. 
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 All necessary steps should be taken to protect the election process from 
fraud, abuse, and error at any stage.27 
If the burden of proof for voter eligibility is purely on the voter, it can 
understandably be a hardship for those who are impoverished, affected by disasters, or 
otherwise unable to produce verifiable documents. If the burden of proof for voter 
verification is purely on the state, gaps in verification tools may lead to voter fraud. A 
reasonable solution must be found that balances the two needs.  
This thesis delves into whether a national voter registration list and biometric 
technology, combined or independently used, could enhance the integrity of elections, 
prevent or mitigate voter fraud, and deter voter disenfranchisement. According to the 
U.S. Agency for International Development, national voter registration lists are common 
throughout western democracies. These same nations enjoy higher confidence in 
elections than the United States.28 Further, biometrics is becoming a standard for identity 
verification throughout the globe and is commonly used in many U.S.-based companies 
and government entities for identity management.  
Using biometrics may satisfy all parties by encouraging participation, adding 
convenience, protecting integrity, and ensuring accurate voter registration listings are 
maintained. By using biometric technologies, voters may not need an identification card 
to vote no matter where they live in the United States. Voters could simply press their 
fingers against a scanner to have their identity verified, for example.29 Biometrics could 
pave the way for eventual online voting with fingerprint scan verification, even for 
military personnel stationed abroad. Many countries across the globe are successfully 
adopting biometric technology to improve the integrity of their elections. The 
                                                 
27 Eric A. Fischer, R. Sam Garrett, and L. Paige Whitaker, State Voter Identification Requirements: 
Analysis, Legal Issues, and Policy Considerations, CRS Report No. R42806 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42806.pdf. 
28 U.S. Agency International Development, Civil and Voter Registries: Lessons Learned from Global 
Experiences, ed. Michael Yard (Washington, DC: International Foundations for Electoral Systems, 2011), 
8, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaea087.pdf. 
29 Justin Lee, “Introducing Biometrics in the U.S. Voting Process: Q&A with Dave Gerulski,” 
Biometric Update, October 16, 2016, http://www.biometricupdate.com/201610/introdIucing-biometrics-in-
the-u-s-voting-process-qa-with-dave-gerulski. 
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International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) reports 35 percent 
(or 45 countries) of over 130 surveyed electoral management bodies (generally nations) 
are utilizing biometrics to enhance part of their voter registration and verification 
process.30  
A. THE PROBLEM OF VOTER FRAUD 
Americans elect their nation’s leaders through an election system many consider 
weak.31 Daily, these leaders make critical decisions affecting the security and well-being 
of Americans.  
Our leaders, particularly younger ones, should see this broad discontent as 
one of America’s greatest challenges and work hard to address it as we 
would more traditional foreign or domestic policy challenges. A central 
path to re-establishing trust is to re-imagine and build a modern electoral 
system in the U.S. that can begin to restore a more persuasive sense of 
consent by the American people in their leaders. This issue is not a 
partisan one, but an American one, and it needs to be addressed with the 
kind of vigor and determination we’ve seen so many times in our proud 
history.32 
As elections have been designated a national interest, it is time to seek innovative ways to 
shore up election vulnerabilities and regain public trust. 
1. Research Questions 
 To what extent does the potential for voter eligibility fraud exist? Are 
ineligible individuals voting? If yes, what implications does fraud have for 
the preservation of democracy? 
                                                 
30 Peter Wolf et al., Introducing Biometric Technology in Elections (Stockholm: International Institute 
for Democracy for Electoral Assistance, 2017), 5, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/intro 
ducing-biometric-technology-in-elections.pdf.  
31 Simon Rosenberg, “Keep the Faith: Three Steps to Modernize and Reform American Elections 
Would Help Rebuild Faith in Our Democracy,” U.S. News & World Report, April 25, 2016, https://www. 
usnews.com/news/articles/2016-04-25/voting-reform-is-one-of-americas-biggest-challenges; Norris, Why 
American Elections are Flawed (And How to Fix Them). 
32 Rosenberg.  
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 Would the use of a national voter registration database with a biometric 
program better balance identity and eligibility verification to ensure that 
all eligible voters can vote and that those who are ineligible do not? 
2. Literature Review 
The objective of this literature review is to understand the scholarly arguments 
and theories regarding real or perceived voter fraud impacts to democracy, election 
integrity, and the legal framework surrounding election administration.  
a. The Importance of Free and Fair Elections in a Democracy  
Eminent scholars Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl describe the elements 
of a democratic society and how internal and external influences affect the level of 
democracy that enhance or degrade its stability.33 They share, “The most popular 
definition of democracy equates it with regular elections, fairly conducted and honestly 
counted…However central to democracy, elections occur intermittently and only allow 
citizens to choose between the highly aggregated alternatives offered by political 
parties.”34  
Schmitter and Karl go on to state, free and fair elections “by the consent of the 
people” is one of two principles that make a nation democratic.35 The other principle is 
“by the contingent consent of politicians acting under conditions of bounded 
uncertainty.”36 This last concept is more intricate; the losing candidate honors a 
peaceable transition of the winner of an election to the office.37 The losing candidate and 
citizenry accept the outcome of the election and consent to the winner the authority to 
make binding decisions.38 The winning party respects the right of the losing candidate to 
                                                 
33 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy is…and is Not,” 75–88. 
34 Schmitter and Karl, 75–88; Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” 2. 
35 Schmitter and Karl, 82. 
36 Schmitter and Karl, 82. 
37 Schmitter and Karl; Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” 
38 Schmitter and Karl; Schedler.  
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become a candidate again in a future election. These democratic principles cannot occur 
without election integrity. 
Andreas Schedler echoes Schmitters and Karl’s notion that positive and negative 
influences affect the level of democracy in a nation, such as divergence of democratic 
values and erosion of the institutional pillars of democracy.39  
For example, state violence as well as state weakness may subvert the rule 
of law: the rise of hegemonic parties may suffocate electoral competition. 
The decay of electoral institutions may affect the honesty of vote 
counting; incumbents may use their privileged access to state resources 
and to the mass media in ways that violate minimum standards of electoral 
fairness and equal opportunity; or the introduction of exclusionary 
citizenship laws may violate democratic norms of inclusiveness.40 
A vulnerable election system may not just affect the outcome of an election; it 
may additionally affect the strength of democracy in a nation.41 Distinguished political 
scientist Robert Dahl defined “democratic” as aligned with the principle of one person, 
one vote, which is also known as majority rule.42 Democracy cannot survive without free 
and impartial elections that legitimately elect the nation’s leaders.43  
Larry Diamond, co-founder of the Journal of Democracy and with Stanford’s 
Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, believes the world has been in 
a protracted democratic recession since 2006.44 After 30 years of increasing growth in 
political freedom and civil rights, the trend peaked in 2005. Diamond explains the halt in 
democratic expansion may be the start of a decline, specifically in the “world’s 
established, rich democracies” in sustainability and confidence.45 In a 2015 article, 
                                                 
39 Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?”  
40 Schedler.  
41 Commission on Federal Election Reform, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, 18. 
42 Robert Dahl, How Democratic Is the American Constitution? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2003). 
43 Peter B. Counter, “Biometrics Now Mandatory for Voting in the Philippines,” Find Biometrics, 
June 2, 2014, http://findbiometrics.com/biometrics-now-mandatory-for-voting-in-the-philippines; Schedler, 
“What is Democratic Consolidation?” 97. 
44 Larry Diamond, “Facing up to Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 3 (January 
2015): 141–155, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Diamond-26-1_0.pdf. 
45 Diamond, 141–155. 
 9
Diamond suggests that these mainly western democracies have been in decline perhaps 
due to the growing evidence of deteriorating public confidence in political parties, which 
are a core institution of democracies.46 This decline also translates into confidence in 
political competition for and the outcome of elections. 
Jeff Fisher, senior advisor for Governance and Elections at the International 
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), authored a comprehensive report on electoral 
conflict and the violence resulting from the breakdown of electoral processes 
worldwide.47 With similar international experience, Pippa Norris provides a detailed 
overview on failings within the U.S. elections and how to resolve them.48 Ms. Norris 
steers EIP along with an international advisory board. EIP is co-located at the University 
of Sydney and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.  
Fisher and Norris provide findings on how elections are administered across the 
world. They assess what went right and what went wrong, and show evidence of what 
may happen when election vulnerabilities exist.49 Fisher determines: 
The international community has played a significant role in promoting 
standards and best practices in election administration. These experiences 
have established benchmarks for performance that can guide policy-
makers in further programming initiatives.50  
Election officials and state legislators can learn lessons from entities that study 
international elections. They can also consider adopting best practices that work for 
nations that rank high in election integrity and confidence. 
                                                 
46 Diamond, 141–155. 
47 Jeff Fisher, Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention (Arlington, VA: 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2002), 2–3, http://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/econ 
flictpaper.pdf.  
48 Norris, Why American Elections are Flawed (And How to Fix Them), 2, 4; Pippa Norris and Max 
Gromping, Populist Threats to Electoral Integrity: The Year in Elections, 2016–2017 (Sydney, Australia: 
The Electoral Integrity Project: University of Sydney, 2017), 33. 
49 Fisher, Electoral Conflict and Violence; Norris, Why American Elections are Flawed (And How to 
Fix Them). 
50 Fisher.  
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b. Voter Eligibility Fraud—A Deliberative Discourse 
To learn the scope of the voter eligibility fraud debate, this thesis gathered and 
reviewed publications, articles, surveys, and studies from a number of sources. 
Mainstream media articles on voter fraud were critically reviewed for nuggets of fact by 
reviewing sources. Better foundations for gauging the likelihood of the existence of voter 
fraud were from leading scholars, eminent election experts, and government 
investigators.  
Amongst all these sources, two distinct camps emerged.  
(1) Voter Fraud Is Rare or Does Not Exist 
Pippa Norris with EIP produced a blog article analyzing the possibility of voter 
fraud in February 2017 entitled “Could Massive Voter Fraud Have Occurred in the 2016 
Presidential Election?”51 She responded to the claims of a rigged election and millions of 
fraudulent voters by referring to several studies.  
Study after study investigating these issues has found no systematic 
evidence supporting the claim of large-scale voter fraud, defined as cases 
involving voters casting multiple ballots in an election, casting a ballot 
when disqualified to do so, or voter impersonation.52 
Ms. Norris refers to the Washington Post studies of specific voter impersonation 
fraud and concepts.53 These studies do not appear to link to scientific examination of 
voter eligibility verification.54 She also ties her findings back to Lorraine Minnite’s 
study, “The Politics of Voter Fraud,” in which Minnite finds claims “alleging voter fraud 
                                                 
51 Pippa Norris, “Could Massive Voter Fraud Have Occurred in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election? 







is fraud.”55 Minnite herself argues evidence of voter fraud lies with law enforcement 
efforts to detect and prosecute it.56  
The Brennan Center for Justice published an article finding that allegations of 
voter fraud are exaggerated.57 This organization, within the New York University School 
of Law, points out the error of stating fraud claims based upon matching lists are 
flawed.58 The Brennan Center for Justice produced another article entitled, “Debunking 
the Voter Fraud Myth.” This report focused on impersonation fraud, court records, and 
government investigations. A consistent theme is voter fraud can only be evidenced 
through law enforcement or court actions. 
(2) Voter Fraud Exists 
A 2007 report written by Craig Donsanto and Nancy Simmons with the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) Public Integrity Section details election crime prosecutions, 
which include crimes of voter fraud. The authors share three types of election crime most 
often prosecuted at the federal level: illegally obtaining and marking of fake ballots, 
engaging in corruption in counting and certification of election results, and committing 
fraud during the registration of voters.59 They present over 127 federal election fraud 
cases as examples of statutes and methods for prosecution. These cases demonstrate that 
although election fraud may not be rampant, these crimes are occurring.60  
Jess T. Richman, Gulshan A. Chattha, and David C. Earnest produced a 2014 
article for the journal Electoral Studies that focused on the existence and implications of 
                                                 
55 Norris. 
56 Lorraine C. Minnite, The Politics of Voter Fraud (Washington, DC: Project Vote, 2007), http:// 
www.nonprofitvote.org/documents/2011/03/project-vote-politics-of-voter-fraud.pdf. 
57 Brennan Center for Justice, Investigator’s Guide to “Voter Fraud” (New York: Brennan Center for 
Justice, 2006), 1, https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Investigator%27s%20Guide 
%20to%20Voter%20Fraud.pdf. 
58 Brennan Center for Justice, 1. 
59 Craig Donsanto and Nancy L. Simmons, Federal Prosecutions of Election Offenses: Seventh 
Edition (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section, 2007), 2–3. 
60 Donsanto and Simmons. 
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non-citizen voting.61 The group determined voter fraud is extremely difficult to isolate 
due to the numerous jurisdictions and policies. To study the potential, they used data 
from the 2008 and 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies, which was an 
internet-based survey collected pre-election October and post-election in November.62 
The authors’ work delivers some of the first national estimations of non-citizen 
immigrants who claimed to have voted in U.S. elections. This finding provides strong 
indicators of the existence of fraudulent voting.  
A 2005 DOJ document entitled, “Preliminary Findings of Joint Task Force 
Investigating Possible Election Fraud,” was a valuable and unique find. This task force 
focused on elections conducted in Wisconsin.63 This review substantiated over 100 
individual cases of voter fraud and over 200 instances where felons voted.64 The group 
claimed poor record-keeping practices hindered investigators who noted that even records 
were missing.65 The task force’s preliminary findings were included in a 2006 Election 
Assistance Commission (EAC) Election Crimes report.66 
c. Voter Identity and Eligibility Verification Practices 
An important element for this particular research was trying to ascertain if voter 
eligibility fraud could [emphasis added] exist. To gain this understanding, a 
comprehensive list of voter identity and eligibility verification policies, practices, and 
vulnerability assessments were gathered and reviewed, to include the following. 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) June 2016 report details 
state policies and laws, how voters cast their ballots (in person, online, by mail, or 
                                                 
61 Jess T. Richman, Gulshan A. Chattha, and David C. Earnest, “Do Non-Citizens Vote in U.S. 
Elections,” Electoral Studies 36 (September 2014): 149–150, https://www.journals.elsevier.com/electoral-
studies/news/electoral-studies-and-the-2016-us-election. 
62 Richman, Chattha, and Earnest, 150. 
63 Department of Justice, “Preliminary Findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election 
Fraud,” 1, May 10, 2005, http://p2004.org/states/wifraud051005.html. 
64 Department of Justice, 1. 
65 Department of Justice, 1. 
66 Election Assistance Commission, Election Crimes Report, December, 2006 (Silver Spring, MD: 
Government Printing Office, 2006), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/1/2006%20Election%20Crimes%20 
Report.pdf. 
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absentee), registration procedures (online, in person and/or by mail), and the 
establishment of polling places.67 Although the states have the responsibility to 
administer the elections, actual implementation is often left to local officials.68 This 
report allowed a glimpse into just how disparate jurisdictions can be. This GAO report 
provided a comprehensive study on what practices seem to be work and what challenges 
exist. The report details successes and difficulties states have with information sharing. 
This information sharing relates to both internal sharing of information between the 
various jurisdictions and state entities, as well as externally with other states and federal 
systems.  
The GAO report also identified common voter identity management practices.69 
The report analyzed what practices are successful and where vulnerabilities may exist.70 
The GAO report also provides a glimpse into the effects of certain voter registration and 
election policies starting with the Help America Vote Act of 2002 and the resulting state 
legislative responses.71 The report also provides a cost benefit analysis on the use of 
various election tactics in an attempt to increase voter turnout, as well as the effects of 
select policies and practices. Several quantitative studies based on information that may 
be otherwise difficult to access within state voter registration databases are made 
available through this report.  
A January 2014 memorandum from the EAC shows the challenges states have in 
verifying eligibility. Specifically, this piece contains an important and precedent decision 
regarding requests from Arizona, Georgia, and Kansas to “include additional proof-of-
                                                 
67 Rebecca Gambler, Elections: Issues Related to Registering Voters and Administering Elections, 
GAO-16-630 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2016), 1–4, http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/680/678131.pdf. 
68 Gambler, 1–4. 
69 Gambler; Election Assistance Commission, The 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey, 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 1, https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/2012-
election-administration-voting-survey/. 
70 “The Founders and Federalism,” USHistory.org, accessed on October 17, 2016, http://www.ushis 
tory.org/gov/3a.asp. 
71 Gambler, Elections, 1–4. 
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citizenship instructions on the National Mail Voter Registration Form” in January 2014.72 
This memo details the EAC response to the request by the three states that requested 
updates to the federal form, specifically notifying applicant voters they would be required 
to submit proof of U.S. citizenship prior to being accepted in the state’s voter registration 
database.73 The EAC denied the requests by the three states, finding their need is not 
supported by the public and each state did not sufficiently prove election fraud was 
occurring in their states to the degree needed to change a federal form.74  
d. Registrations and the Notion of a National Voter Registration List 
The PEW Center on the States published a 2012 report that focuses on the 
accuracy of state registration listings.75 The non-profit organization’s research concluded 
that approximately 24 million voter registration records are erroneous.76 The report 
makes the argument the various state voter registration systems “must be brought into the 
21st century to be more accurate, cost-effective, and efficient.”77 
R. Michael Alvarez and Thad E. Hall produced a joint California Institute of 
Technology (Caltech) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology report documenting 
voter registration methods.78 These scholars claim the United States uses a passive 
method to register voters and the burden of registering is on the voter.79 Other democratic 
                                                 
72 Alice P. Miller, “Memorandum of Decision Concerning State Requests to Include Additional Proof-
of-Citizenship Instructions on the National Mail Voter Registration Form” (official memorandum, 
Washington, DC: U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2014), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/20140117 
%20EAC%20Final%20Decision%20on%20Proof%20of%20Citizenship%20Requests%20-%20FINAL. 
pdf. 
73 Miller, 1–5.  
74 Miller, 22–23. 
75 Pew Center on the States, Inaccurate, Costly, and Inefficient: Evidence That America’s Voter 
Registration System Needs an Upgrade (Washington, DC: Pew Center on the States, 2012), 1, http://www. 
pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pewupgradingvoterregistrationpdf.pdf.  
76 PEW Center on the States, 1. 
77 PEW Center on the States, 1. 
78 R. Michael Alvarez and Thad E. Hall, Resolving Voter Registration Problems: Making Registration 
Easier, Less Costly and More Accurate (Pasadena, CA and Cambridge, MA: Caltech/MIT Voting 
Technology Project, 2009), 3, https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/96618/wp_87.pdf;seque 
nce=1.  
79 Alvarez and Hall, 3. 
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nations have compulsory or active methods, they assert, that increase the voter rolls and 
ease the liability from the voters.80 The authors argue that the government bearing the 
burden of finding eligible citizens and ensuring they are on the registration list is an 
advantage for the election process.81  
Mentioned earlier, Expanding Democracy, by Jennifer S. Rosenberg with 
Margaret Chen, was a valuable source that explains the national voter registration list that 
Canada, a federally governed nation, uses called the National Register.82 The authors 
focus on the fundamental elements of democracy and justice as a basis for the choice of a 
national system.83 This publication is the second in a sequence of white papers produced 
by the Brennan Center’s Voting Rights and Election Projects that focus on voter 
registration modernization.84 Rosenberg and Chen lay out the methods democratic 
countries use to build and maintain their voter rolls and detail how, in comparison with 21 
other nations, the United States has a very low registration rate that falls at 68 percent of 
eligible voters.85 The authors detail how Canada modernized its voter roll system, once 
separated into multiple territory and provincial databases, into a national system. By 
doing so, Rosenberg and Chen contend Canada increased the integrity in the voter rolls, 
bolstered election confidence, and saved the nation an approximate $30 million Canadian 
dollars (or $22.5 million U.S. dollars) per four-year election cycle.86 Extrapolated to the 
population size of the United States, the savings would be enormous. A notable concept 
from their paper is that most democratic governments play an active role of adding voters 
to the list, which carry the burden of registration, instead of placing the burden on the 
                                                 
80 Alvarez and Hall, 3. 
81 Alvarez and Hall, 3. 
82 Jennifer S. Rosenberg with Margaret Chen, Expanding Democracy: Voter Registration around the 
World (New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2009), 10, http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
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83 Rosenberg with Chen, 1. 
84 Rosenberg with Chen, 2. 
85 Rosenberg with Chen, 6. 
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voters. Some of the main ways the governments eases the burden is through civil 
registries, data sharing with other agencies, and canvassing.87 
e. Biometrics as a Possible Solution 
The only reliable way to tell the uniqueness of a person from one individual to 
another is through biometrics. In comparison, biographic information frequently changes 
throughout a person’s lifetime. Names, addresses, dates of birth, and other identifiers can 
be intentionally or unintentionally altered. Biometrics is trustworthy and reliable. Out of 
the various types of biometrics used for identity verification including iris and retina 
scans, facial recognition, DNA tests, and voice recognition, fingerprints are the most 
commonly used.88 Fingerprints develop in the womb and are unique. Not even identical 
twins share the same fingerprints. Beyond the growth of the thumb and digit from 
childhood into adulthood, the print remains uniquely the same.89 As a result, biometrics, 
and fingerprints in general, have become increasingly critical in identify verification, 
which leads to safeguarding the homeland and protecting access to sensitive programs. 
Additionally, biometrics is becoming more relied upon in the civilian sectors.90  
Over 45 nations have added biometrics to their voter registration requirements as 
a method for identifying voters, including Europe, the Near East, Africa and Latin 
America.91 Some countries have been using biometrics in elections for over a decade.92  
Justin Lee, of the Biometric Research Group, offers a 2016 journal article entitled 
“Introducing Biometrics in the U.S. Voting Process: Q&A with Dave Gerulski.”93 Lee 
suggests that the requirement for a voter to present identification at the time of voting is 
                                                 
87 Rosenberg with Chen, 9. 
88 “UCSB ScienceLine,” University of California—Santa Barbara, October 10, 2011, http://science 
line.ucsb.edu/getkey.php?key=2650. 
89 University of California—Santa Barbara. 
90 “What is Biometrics,” Michigan State University, Department of Computer Science and 
Engineering, accessed February 18, 2018, http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/info/index.html. 
91 Wolf et al., Introducing Biometric Technology in Elections, 17. 
92 Wolf et al., 17. 
93 Lee, “Introducing Biometrics in the U.S. Voting Process.”  
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obtrusive and might negatively influence voter turnout, thereby suppressing votes.94 
Jurisdictions using fingerprint technology would no longer need to require state-issued 
identification during elections. After a biometric program is implemented, Lee submits 
that voters could press their fingers against a fingerprint scanner at the polling site to 
have their identity verified.95 The concept sounds overly simple; learning from other 
expert sources as to security, plausibility, and adoptability of a biometrics program was 
next.  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) identity management identification 
services website details how biometrics have long been utilized to enhance U.S. national 
security by identifying individuals at ports-of-entry, in airports, and across other 
screening programs.96 The site reveals that the increased use of biometrics on college 
campuses, for banking transactions, phone and laptop access, driver’s licenses, and public 
benefits are paving the way to consumer acceptance.97 Many states currently have 
automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS) embedded for credentialing and law 
enforcement purposes.98  
Several states have begun using biometrics as an identity management tool for 
driver’s licenses, and also for public benefits recipients. John Fontana, of Identity 
Matters, highlights the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicle biometrics program for 
implementing a multi-year identity management implementation plan.99 The system 
shares authentication data across state agencies so citizens can access services across 
many agencies in an attempt to improve service and reduce fraud. Plan supporters expect 
the program will save enough money to cover the cost of the program solely by fraud 
                                                 
94 Lee. 
95 Lee. 
96 “Office of Biometric Identity Management Identification Services,” Department of Homeland 
Security, accessed on March 1, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/obim-biometric-identification-services. 
97 Department of Homeland Security. 
98 Rawlson O’Neil King, “Law Enforcement and Biometrics,” Biometric Update, January 2016, 
http://www.biometricupdate.com/201601/special-report-law-enforcement-and-biometrics.  
99 John Fontana, “DMV Driving Virginia’s Next-Gen Identity System,” ZDNet, March 21, 2013, 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/dmv-driving-virginias-next-gen-identity-system/. 
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prevention.100 Biometrics appears to be a growing identity management solution for 
many entities, both in the government and commercial arenas. 
f. Biometric-Related Challenges 
Peter B. Counter’s Findbiometrics.com article “Biometrics Now Mandatory for 
Voting in the Philippines” reveals how the Philippines is utilizing biometrics to verify 
identity of voters in the effort to prevent multiple registrations and voter fraud.101 Voter 
participation is mandatory and individuals wanting to have their vote counted must have 
registered their biometrics in their national system. One of the challenges Philippine 
officials experienced was compelling eligible voters to register and have their biometrics 
taken prior to the nation’s cut-off date. Counter suggests that if a nation restricts voting to 
citizens to those who have registered and provided their biometrics in advance, it may 
well suppress eligible voters. Certainly, a phased approach over a lengthy period might 
better facilitate success. 
A number of nations, including Uganda, Kyrgyzstan, and Ghana, have added 
biometrics to their voter registration requirements as a method for identifying voters, 
whether with a biometric card or biometric readers at the polling sites. The article 
“Biometric ‘Wahala’ in Nigeria Election—Any Lesson for Ghana 2016?” explains that 
during the 2012 elections in Ghana, widespread biometric voter card-reading machine 
failure was experienced. The government ended up extending voting to a second day, as a 
result, and stopped the use of the card readers.102 Since that time, Ghana has effectively 
reduced the outages and has achieved a transparent, peaceful transition of power through 
its December 2016 elections.103  
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This literary review highlights works by several eminent election experts, which 
expose the scholarly discourse on the possibility of voter fraud. The basis for their 
analysis stems from numerous comprehensive surveys and polls, self-initiated or from 
other sources, conducted throughout the past 20 years. This data became a foundation for 
the overall analysis within this thesis as well.  
The U.S. Constitution, as well as federal and state statutes, was analyzed to 
understand the legal framework for elections and how these legalities play into 
developing policies, prevention, and ultimately holding individuals accountable for voter 
fraud. Many of the thesis literary sources were government reports, from the GAO, the 
DHS, and the DOJ. Publications from the EAC demonstrated voter eligibility fraud, other 
election flaws, and corresponding solutions to mitigate the issues.  
State voter fraud assessments based on quantitative and qualitative data were not 
available. These assessments would be, if fully transparent and comprehensive, a critical 
source to understand fully the prevalence or lack of voter fraud occurring on voter 
registration lists and found during audits. Nevertheless, the remaining sources provide 
substantive information to answer the thesis research questions sufficiently. 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
During the 2016 presidential elections, candidates, federal agencies, and 
mainstream media voiced concerns over election vulnerabilities based on cyber attacks 
and voter fraud. The DHS designated elections as critical infrastructure in January 
2017.104 This designation led to the prospect of analyzing system vulnerabilities and 
seeking a solution to help safeguard elections. As such, a policy analysis was used to 
detect vulnerabilities, ascertain how to prevent fraudulent voting, and present solutions. It 
explored the prospects of a national voter registration list and biometrics as solutions, the 
benefits and impacts of which result in policy recommendations. 
                                                 
104 Katie Bo Williams, “DHS Designates Election Systems as ‘Critical Infrastructure’,” The Hill, 
January 6, 2017, http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/313132-dhs-designates-election-systems-as-
critical-infrastructure. 
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1. Data Sources 
For this research, court documents, DOJ publications, an EAC study, and 
published surveys provided valuable information to understanding the existence and 
scope of voter fraud. Commission studies, political science think tank publications, 
academic institute research groups, and published surveys offered valuable insight into 
public perception and confidence in elections. State and federal government and 
organization websites, including the National Conference of State Legislatures website, 
provided insight on election management practices. Published reports from academic and 
non-profit organizations aiding countries with increasing election integrity around the 
world were useful for understanding biometric technologies used for elections. The 
Canada Elections website and the Brennan Center for Justice provided ample information 
on Canada’s National Register, which is its national voter registration list. A variety of 
state and federal government documents were gathered and analyzed, specifically those 
relating to statutes, policies, and procedures.  
As part of the thesis research, surveys were sent to state election officials. This 
effort gained valuable voter verification policy and practice information direct from 24 
state election officials. The survey consisted of seven questions and each state election 
director received the same survey questionnaire (See Appendix A). An October 2017 
National Association of State Election Directors roster was used for the contact 
information.105 Emails were sent out to the 51 states and District of Columbia election 
board directors. Twenty-four responses were received. The survey responses were pulled 
together into charts and then analyzed (see Appendix B).  
Survey Questions: 
 What documents are required to show proof of in terms of age and 
residency to become a registered voter?  
 How does the state verify citizenship for voting? 
                                                 
105 “National Association of State Election Directors Roster,” National Association of State Election 
Directors, October 4, 2017, http://www.nased.org/. 
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 How often does your state perform statewide voter roll maintenance 
(address changed, name changes, additions and verifications)? 
 What resources does your state use for managing the statewide voter roll? 
 What occurs when a non-citizen, an individual living in a different state, 
or otherwise ineligible person is detected and confirmed during voter 
registration or maintenance? 
 If your state offers mail-in registration and mail-in voting, does your state 
check identification and at what point? 
 Who prosecutes voter fraud in your state? 
2. Type and Mode of Analysis 
This thesis used a policy analysis framework to learn if a voter fraud problem 
exists for U.S. elections. The analysis defined the voter fraud spectrum and narrowed the 
review to voter identity and eligibility fraud possibly occurring due to vulnerabilities in 
the verification process. The evaluation considered constitutional and current federal and 
state laws. It assembled current practices used by the many states, and deconstructed 
them to detect gaps in the processes. The examination isolated specific verification 
challenges and exposed gaps. It then reviewed the impact the identified vulnerabilities 
would have on election integrity, confidence in elections, and ultimately, on democracy. 
After the inquiry concluded, the thesis examined the feasibility of a national voter 
registration list and use of biometrics as two potential solutions to shore up confirmed 
susceptibilities. 
3. Limits 
For the purpose of this thesis, only one type of election vulnerability was studied 
and presented. This research did not focus on cyber-security threats, gerrymandering, or 
insider threats, but more narrowly on voter identity and eligibility verification 
vulnerabilities, and potential solutions.  
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Elections create copious amounts of data, yet a lack of available information has 
resulted regarding state voter registration eligibility audits and assessments. The lack of 
quantitative data on registration inconsistencies, identified ineligible voters, and how 
fraud, once detected, is handled prevents a comprehensive understanding of the extent to 
which fraud prevails. This limitation prohibited a solid knowledge of how state officials 
manage and maintain the information, how they detect ineligible voters, and how they 
address discrepancies. Adding to the research challenge, election officials differ in how 
they treat misrepresentation on a registration card, and when fraud has occurred after an 
ineligible voter has voted. Officials may resolve misrepresentation and fraud at the local 
level as a civil response, or they may elevate it to state or to federal prosecution 
consideration. Voter fraud may be charged in many ways, whether under local, state, or 
federal statutes such as false statements, fraud and misrepresentation, or false claims to 
U.S. citizenship. The EAC 2005 report on election crimes was helpful with exposing 
voter fraud information and statistics; however, no other comprehensive local, state, or 
federal report was found. Although it is the mission of the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(BJS) within the DOJ to collect, analyze, publish, and disseminate criminal information 
for all levels of government, no BJS reports were found that focus on election crimes. 
These challenges are limitations for this study. Data restrictions and a lack of 
transparency impede a comprehensive examination of the issue.106 
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the 
problem statement and lays out the literature review and research design. Chapter II 
discusses the evidence of voter fraud, considers confidence in U.S. elections, and 
deliberates how voter fraud affects democracy. Chapter III explains how federalism plays 
into U.S. elections and reviews the various federal laws and commissions Congress 
enacted to ensure free and fair elections. Chapter IV details state voter verification 
practices and describes strengths and vulnerabilities within the processes. Chapter V digs 
into verification challenges, misgivings about voter identification laws, the difficulties of 
                                                 
106 Lonna Rae Atkeson, “Election Data Transparency,” in The Measure of American Elections, ed. 
Barry C. Burden and Charles Stewart III (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 271.  
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verifying citizenship, using the REAL ID Act driver’s licenses for voter verification, 
mail-in registration and voting susceptibilities, and the complications of keeping the voter 
registration list clean. Finally, Chapter VI discusses innovative solutions, including using 
a national voter registration database in a fashion similar to Canada and the potential for 
embedding biometrics for identity and eligibility verification purposes. Lastly, Chapter 
VII concludes with research findings and recommendations for enhancing voter 
verification to promote election integrity. 
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II. IMPLICATIONS OF VOTER ELIGIBILITY FRAUD  
This chapter sharply focuses on answering research question number one: To 
what extent does the potential for voter eligibility fraud exist? Are ineligible individuals 
voting? If yes, what implications does fraud have for the preservation of democracy? The 
chapter examines evidence of voter eligibility fraud, how election confidence is measured 
and why confidence is important, and how voter fraud may influence the health of a 
democratic system. As available information was analyzed to determine evidence, three 
central questions were answered: what evidence is there of fraud, is there a vulnerability 
that would allow fraud to exist, and why does fraud matter? 
A. EVIDENCE OF VOTER ELIGIBILITY FRAUD  
Publically elected leaders, as well as mainstream and social media, and even 
scholarly sources offer many opinions on whether voter eligibility fraud exists in the 
United States. Searching for voter fraud on the internet will undoubtedly return political 
far left media articles touting that fraudulent voting does not exist, or if it does, it is 
exceedingly rare.107 On the extreme political right, it is possible to find plenty of articles 
claiming fraudulent voting is rampant.108  
Gathering election evidence is complicated. The information is hard to find and 
due to the complexity of the election system (system within systems), no way to gather 
reliable data consistently is available. Even a state election official may be challenged to 
gather statistics from the local election boards. Although mainstream media articles on 
voter fraud are common, finding comprehensive data on voter fraud cases was 
problematic. The lack of prosecutions and assessments may lead people to believe fraud 
is uncommon. Only a few studies focus on understanding whether fraudulent voting is 
                                                 
107 Note: For an example of a typical far left article see Philip Bump, “Here’s How Rare In-Person 
Voter Fraud Is,” Washington Post, August 3, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/ 
2016/08/03/heres-how-rare-in-person-voter-fraud-is/?utm_term=.2918a8a6dbc4. 
108 For an example of a typical far right article see Joe Otto, “Data Proves that Voter Fraud is 
Rampant,” Conservative Daily, April 4, 2014, https://conservative-daily.com/2014/04/04/data-proves-that-
voter-fraud-is-rampant/. 
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occurring, whether gaps in processes allow for the possibility, and how pervasive the 
problem may be.  
1. The 2006 EAC Study on Election Crimes 
A 2006 EAC study concentrated on voter fraud and voter intimidation.109 In this 
study, the EAC found that although a number of isolated studies on voter crimes have 
occurred, never before had a comprehensive, nationwide study been conducted. Its report 
attempted to remedy this gap. The EAC researchers interviewed key election experts in 
the field at the local, state, and federal levels; they reviewed books, reports, analyzed 
reported prosecutions, and studied media reports of fraud and intimidation.110 The group 
found no nationwide consensus for the basic definitions of voter fraud, and officials had a 
broad spectrum of beliefs on whether voter fraud was an actionable civil wrong or 
constituted a criminal act.111  
To establish a common definition, the EAC defined election crimes as:112  
intentional acts or willful failures to act, prohibited by state or federal law, 
that are designed to cause ineligible persons to participate in the election 
process; eligible persons to be excluded from the election process; 
ineligible votes to be cast in an election; eligible votes not to be cast or 
counted; or other interference with or invalidation of election results. 
Election crimes generally fall into one of four categories: acts of 
deception, acts of coercion, acts of damage or destruction, and failures or 
refusals to act.  
Election crimes can be committed by voters, candidates, election officials, 
or any other members of the public who desire to criminally impact the 
result of an election. However, crimes that are based upon intentional or 
willful failure to act assume that a duty to act exists. Election officials 
                                                 
109 Election Assistance Commission, Election Crimes: An Initial Review and Recommendations for 
Future Study (Washington, DC: Election Assistance Commission, 2006), 5, https://www.eac.gov/assets/ 
1/1/2006%20Election%20Crimes%20Report.pdf. 
110 Election Assistance Commission, 2–5.  
111 Election Assistance Commission, 2. 
112 Election Assistance Commission, 2. 
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have affirmative duties to act with regard to elections. By and large, other 
groups and individuals do not have such duties.113 
It is valuable to compare the EAC definition with the federal statutes of voter 
identity and eligibility fraud: 
Knowingly procuring eligibility to vote for federal office by persons who 
are not entitled to vote under applicable state law, notably persons who 
have committed serious crimes (approximately 40 states) (42 USC §§ 
1973i(c), 1973gg-10(2)), and persons who are not United States citizens 
(currently all states) (42 USC §§ 1973i(c), 1973gg-10(2); 18 USC §§ 
1015(f), 611). 
Knowingly making a false claim of United States citizenship to register to 
vote or to vote in any election (18 USC § 1015(f)), or falsely and willfully 
claiming US citizenship for, inter alia, registering or voting in any 
election (18 USC § 911). 
Providing false information concerning a person’s name, address, or 
period of residence in a voting district to establish that person’s eligibility 
to register or to vote in a federal election (42 USC §§ 1973i(c), 1973gg-
10(2)).114 
In its report, the EAC goes on to state that “the victim of an election crime can be 
a voter, a group of voters, an election official, a candidate, or the public in general.”115 
Finding the expression of what constitutes an election crime victim was surprising, as this 
expression is not widely used. It is logical that when a crime is committed, a victim is 
always present. In the case of election crimes, and specifically to the potential crime of 
voter fraud discussed within this thesis, voter fraud victimizes the public, the nation, and 
democracy.  
The EAC study highlights preliminary findings of a 2005 Milwaukee joint task 
force investigation, which included investigators from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Milwaukee County District Attorney, Milwaukee Police Department, and a 
                                                 
113 Election Assistance Commission. 
114 Donsanto and Simmons, Federal Prosecutions of Election Offenses: Seventh Edition, 27–28. 
115 Election Assistance Commission, Election Crimes: An Initial Review and Recommendations for 
Future Study, 13. 
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U.S. attorney.116 Investigators reviewed original voter registration records, as the 
Wisconsin voter datasets were deemed defective.117 The task force found, “widespread 
record keeping failures and separate areas of voter fraud.”118 Despite record failures, 
investigators found 100 instances of double-voting, determined that more than 200 felons 
voted, and determined “the number of votes counted for the City of Milwaukee 
exceed[ed] the number of persons recorded by more than 4,500.”119 
The group of researchers reviewed over 40,000 cases identified through a series 
of keywords; they also reviewed thousands of media reports.120  
While these reports showed that there were a large number of allegations 
of voting fraud and voter intimidation, they provided much less 
information as to whether the allegations were ever formalized as 
complaints to law enforcement, whether charges were filed, whether 
prosecutions ensued, and whether any convictions were made. The media 
reports were enlightening regarding the pervasiveness of complaints of 
fraud and intimidation throughout the country, the correlation between 
fraud allegations and the perception that the state was a “battleground” or 
“swing” state, and the fact that there were reports of almost all types of 
voting fraud and voter intimidation. However, these reports do not provide 
much data for analysis as to the number of complaints, charges and 
prosecutions of voting fraud and intimidation throughout the country.121 
In summary, the EAC report suggests election fraud indicators are rampant. The 
EAC goes on to state that hard evidence of actual instances, whether criminally charged 
or dealt with through civil intervention, is not readily available to the EAC.122 It can 
reasonably be concluded that this type of information is not readily available to 
researchers either.  
                                                 
116 Department of Justice, “Preliminary Findings of Joint Task Force Investigating Possible Election 
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2. The Colorado Example 
In Colorado during 2011, 11,805 discrepancies were discovered between driver’s 
license registries where non-citizen status was claimed and yet the individuals were on 
the voter registration rosters.123 Colorado requested the assistance of the DHS in 
understanding if some of the individuals identified had become citizens during the period 
between gaining a driver’s license and registering to vote.124 Of the 11,805 individuals, 
4,214 voted in the 2010 election.125  
3. Remedying Voter Fraud 
Election officials, who are either elected or appointed by partisan actors, differ on 
what the proper venue is for dealing with voter fraud cases. Some believe it is a civil 
matter best rectified at the local court level, while others push cases higher, to the state or 
federal courts.126 The officials appear to have discretion on how to treat false claims on 
the voter registration cards and fraudulent voting. The 2005 EAC study reports, “Very 
few cases that are decided at the district court level are reported for public review.” These 
distinctions affect the ability to gather the information. While civil punishments, 
enforcement actions, and prosecutions for voter fraud would generally result in public 
records, states seem rarely to report voter fraud or compile related data in a way that is 
accessible for researchers or the public.  
It appears no state or federal requirement is on the books for governments to 
expose to the public any findings of ineligible voters on their listings or ineligible voters 
who actually voted, whether for single instances or in reoccurring reports. The methods 
for detecting ineligible voters, resolving potential ineligible voter issues, or dealing with 
ineligible voters who actually voted are all disparate. Jurisdictions may choose not to 
pursue confirmed issues, resolve them by local civil action, or promote them as a case for 
                                                 
123 State of Colorado, Department of State, Comparison of Colorado’s Voter Rolls with Department of 
Revenue Non-Citizen Records (Denver: State of Colorado, Department of State, 2011), http://cha.house. 
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125 State of Colorado, Department of State. 
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 30
county, state, or federal prosecution. No required tracking of these issues appears to be 
required either. 
Whether the lack of transparency is due to shielding the public from this issue, 
because officials do not have the appropriate tools, or because officials are finding no 
issue is unclear. Due to these inconsistencies, historical attempts to analyze voter fraud 
are segmented and fractured. Analyzing the voter verification system as a comprehensive 
critical infrastructure provides a necessary framework to peel back the disparate layers of 
policies and practices to understand what is in place and if vulnerabilities exist.  
4. Lack of Voter Fraud Prosecutions 
Another incongruity is determining voter fraud is rare because few voter fraud 
prosecutions result. While it appears few voter fraud prosecutions have occurred, 
revealing the number of prosecutions is difficult as multiple types of criminal charges 
may be used, and prosecutions may be made at the county, state, or federal levels. Given 
the complexity and span of the legal system, it is problematic to gain an exact number of 
individuals convicted for false claims, false statements, or fraud specific to voter 
eligibility fraud at the federal level. It is impossible to gain it at the state or county levels, 
certainly within the confines of the thesis time limitations. 
In addition, many legitimate criminal cases never reach prosecution. For example, 
in fiscal year 2014, the Bureau of Justice Statistics revealed 14,012 suspects were 
investigated for fraud by the DOJ.127 Of those, only 8,269 were charged in criminal 
cases. Point being, criminal cases may be plea-bargained or declined based upon 
prosecutorial discretion, especially if a non-criminal alternative to prosecution is 
presented.128 Most civil cases are settled. It can be reasonably assumed the same would 
be for voter fraud cases. The burden of proof for clear, convincing, knowing, and willing 
                                                 
127 “Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics,” Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
accessed December 18, 2017, https://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/. 
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is particularly high for a case to be accepted for investigation. Gauging the evidence of 
voter fraud by prosecutions or court cases may be a flawed approach.  
Still, for over 30 years, the DOJ Public Integrity Section has overseen the federal 
effort to combat election fraud and corruption through prosecution. Section attorneys 
prosecute carefully chosen cases against federal, state, and local officials, and serve as 
subject matter experts to other prosecutors and investigators. Their annual report to 
Congress cites specific prosecutions and resulting precedent decisions. As this 
information is based upon court records and evidence gained at a high standard of burden 
of proof, it is extremely valuable and credible to the story on election fraud malfeasance.  
State and federal election crimes often involve the fraudulent use of absentee 
voter ballets, ineligible voting, and false registrations.129 To prevent these offenses, it is 
necessary to detect fraud, in advance, to ensure the integrity of the election process. 
Unfortunately, these crimes are generally identified after the harm is done and the vote is 
counted. The purpose of the crime has been gained. The knowing and willing 
engagement of the crime and clear and convincing material evidence that the crime was 
committed is typically the actual successful cast of a vote or the tangible effect of a 
disruption to an election.  
Although no published reports on state voter fraud assessments based upon voter 
registration maintenance are available, voter fraud prosecutions are occurring.130 It is 
unclear whether the lack of released reports to the public is due to the states choosing not 
to produce reports or due to complications the states may have in verifying voter 
information, including U.S. citizenship. Perhaps, the demand for this research and 
reporting has simply not been made. It appears likely that the states do not have the tools 
they need to vet a voter fully, specifically for verifying citizenship.  
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5. Additional Empirical Information Is Needed 
Comprehensive and transparent assessments are needed, however, to understand 
fully the risks inherent to elections, including voter fraud.131 This issue is corroborated by 
the EAC, which found voter fraud exists, but it cannot discern to what degree it exists.132 
To say fraudulent voting is rampant appears inaccurate, but to say voter fraud is not an 
issue or does not exist is not a fair assessment either. Until local and state officials are 
transparent and faithfully record these incidents in a standardized, measurable way, the 
full scope of the issue cannot be determined. It is impossible to be precise due to the lack 
of information available on the subject. The National Conference for State Legislatures 
(NCSL) has achieved an immense amount of work collating election information for the 
states, and yet, the NCSL affirms in its March 2013 The Canvass,  
For election administration, finding “evidence” is tricky. Every state, and 
frequently every jurisdiction, conducts elections differently, making 
comparisons difficult. Data is not gathered uniformly nationwide as it is in 
many other government arenas. Election costs are hard to track because 
they’re borne by several levels of government. You get the idea—it is hard 
to get facts and figures to support election evaluation.133 
The best evidence of voter fraud would be both in state assessments, which are 
either not conducted or not available, as well as the numbers of county, state, or federal 
prosecutions. Evidence of ineligible voters on the registration rosters, as well as the 
numbers of fraudulent votes would be the type of data ideally gathered. As this 
information is not currently available, any gauge of voter fraud must be in the possibility 
of a voter fraud vulnerability; in other words, the possibility of ineligible voters voting 
and having their vote count.  
In summary: 
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 States are not transparent about how many individuals are found to be 
ineligible when registering or voting.  
 No standard systemic requirement appears to exist for states to audit and 
report to the public how many election crimes or violations they 
encounter. 
 Civil and criminal responses to voter fraud are awkward and inconsistent, 
at best. 
The nation needs more empirical data and stricter scientific study on this topic. 
Local and state data on the numbers of ineligible individuals identified during the 
registration process, registration list maintenance, voting, or attempting to vote by any 
means (at the polling site, absentee or mail-in voting) should be transparent and available 
for researchers and the public.  
6. Conclusion 
Without published audits and empirical data from the states, the facts negating or 
substantiating voter identify fraud are not clear. The only evidence available is cases in 
which voter fraud has been prosecuted, which excludes voter fraud remedied through 
administrative processes, such as mail confirmation and removal of the voter from the 
registration or civil actions.  
B. CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS  
Voter fraud, perceived or real, affects trust in the electoral system.134 It affects 
confidence in the legitimacy of the outcome and may eventually cause democratic 
erosion.135 Measuring voter confidence helps understand how weak election systems 
affect the health of U.S. democracy. The potential for distrust, discord, and diminished 
democracy underscores the need to resolve voter fraud vulnerabilities. 
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A number of ways to measure confidence and develop analytical frameworks 
appear to be available for assessing trust in U.S. elections including quantitative and 
qualitative surveys, election polling, and by aggregating voter registration and 
participation as compared to the number of eligible voters. Neither surveys, polls, nor 
aggregate numbers are perfect, but both can provide an overall sense of election 
performance. Several prominent sources provide detailed surveys. Although their 
questions, word choices, and disclaimers on methods and variances may be different, the 
surveys still provide useful results.  
The majority of recent surveys and polls reveal that American confidence in 
elections is declining. Political scientist Paul Gronke suggests that voter confidence is 
impacted by state laws, the voters mode of voting, their perception of their voting 
experience, and loser’s regret and partisanship.136 According to his survey analysis, 72 
percent of Americans were very confident in elections during 2008, and declined 10 
percent to 62.7 percent for the 2012 elections.137 Those who voted for the winner had a 
higher degree of confidence, while those that voted for the loser had lower confidence. 
Vote-by-mail voters had a confidence of 61.3 percent in 2008 and this percentage 
diminished by 2012 to 55.7 percent.138 When asked about fraud, 22.7 percent of the 2008 
survey participants felt fraud was common.139 This percentage increased in 2012 to 52.5 
percent.140 
As mentioned in Chapter I, according to the EIP) “expert estimates developed by 
EIP, the 2012 and 2014 elections in the United States displayed the worst performance 
among all Western democracies,” and that, in comparison with all 153 included countries 
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in its survey, the United States ranked 52nd worldwide.141 The survey demonstrates 
specific declining trust in election campaign practices and voter registrations.  
In 2012, the Washington Post asked poll participants if voter malfeasance was 
problematic in general elections.142 Nearly 50 percent of the participants believed it to be 
a significant issue; one-third considered it negligible, and one out of six stated it was not 
an issue.143 
During the summer of 2016, in a poll was conducted by the AP-NORC Center for 
Public Affairs Research. Only 36 percent (or 381) of the 1,060 participants stated they 
had “a great deal of confidence” that their vote in the November 2016 election would be 
counted accurately.144 Nearly 700 of those surveyed had only some or hardly any 
confidence in the election. 
In a Gallup poll conducted just prior to the 2016 elections, only 60 percent of the 
1,013 Americans surveyed were confident their vote would be counted in the general 
elections.145 After the 2016 elections, in their 2017 survey, the EIP found that no gains 
were made in U.S. election confidence. The United States ranked 55th worldwide out of 
158 countries, and much lower than the United Kingdom, Australian, and Canadian 
rankings.146  
In sum, it appears confidence in U.S. elections is diminishing, which is causing 
doubt and conflict.147 Election discrepancies and inefficiencies come at a price. The 
evidence is in the implicitly biased narratives, media sensationalism, and public discord 
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surrounding elections and acceptance of national leaders. Multiple survey responses 
demonstrate Americans are discontent and uneasy about the U.S. election system. The 
United States is experiencing a trust deficit in its government. Rebuilding public faith in 
the election system will go a long way in recovering confidence. All weak points should 
be resolved or mitigated in a way that stimulates public confidence and inspires 
participation.  
C. VOTER FRAUD AND DEMOCRACY 
Voting is one of the most fundamental rights and responsibilities of citizens.148 
Democracy cannot exist without free and fair elections.149 When voting fraud occurs, the 
nation, the American public, and democracy are victims.150 Any actual or perceived voter 
fraud can lead to the perception of an unfair, tainted election.151  
Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the 
functioning of our participatory democracy. Voter fraud drives honest 
citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our 
government. Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by 
fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised.152  
Whether real or perceived vulnerabilities to elections exist, simple doubt in the 
reliability and fairness may cause discord and diminish confidence in the voting 
system.153 Speculation, sensationalism, and biased rhetoric add fuel to the fire. As 
confidence erodes, the legitimacy of the election outcomes may be challenged.154 The 
citizenry can be affected by this conjecture and melodrama, unless evidence-based 
information is available and reason can prevail. Whether it is a perfect measure for 
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election efficacy or not, confidence in the U.S. election process is tantamount to the 
perception of how well the democracy is performing.  
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the analytical group for the British-
led Economist Group and sister agency to The Economist newspaper, democracy in the 
United States is definitely eroding.155 Its 2016 study analyzes the status of democracy 
around the globe and scores confidence based upon the following five categories: 
“electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political 
participation; [and] political culture.”156 The Economist reports that the number of full 
democratic nations in the world has dropped from 20 in 2015 to 19 in 2016.157 The 
United States has been downgraded to a “flawed democracy” due to a loss of trust in 
government and elected officials.158  
If fraudulent voting is occurring or perceived due to careless verification 
practices, it can harm the outcome of an election. Voter fraud impacts the constitutional 
and inalienable right for U.S. citizens to have a collective voice in their choice for the 
nation’s leaders. Fraud diminishes election fairness and integrity. Unaddressed, fraud can 
affect the outcome of elections, whether by a literal effect on the number of legitimate 
votes, or by eroding trust in the integrity of the election.  
The manner in which voter fraud is prevented can also fundamentally affect the 
voting opportunity, however. It may discourage voting, or cause undue burdens on 
certain populations, which is clearly out of alignment with the U.S. Constitution. 
Practices need to balance the need for providing the equal opportunity for a U.S. citizen 
to cast a ballot (a free election), while ensuring the additional Constitution requirement 
for integrity (a fair election). A fair election is achieved by mitigating and preventing any 
fraud, abuse, or error, and confirming the laws of the land are being met.159  
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A key factor of a strong, stable democracy is an election considered free and 
fair.160 The evidence for this factor must be both tangible (through scientific analysis) 
and through the perceived confidence of the voters that includes the lead up to the 
election, the ability for voters to register and for ineligible voters to be detected. It also 
considers the actual Election Day, such as the availability and convenience of voting. 
Lastly, it also considers the peaceful, diplomatic transition of power.161 The contentious 
nature of recent elections is another strong indicator that democracy in the United States 
may be backsliding.  
In conclusion, election scholars and experts make valid points about the existence 
or rarity of documented voter fraud prosecutions and detections. Without substantial 
proof by records, prosecutions, and convictions, the research approach for this thesis 
problem had to change. Instead of asking, “does voter fraud exist?” the question became 
“can voter fraud exist?” Do systemic weaknesses exist that allow fraud to be a problem? 
Answering this question required deconstructing current policy and verification practices 
to learn if weaknesses exist that might open the door to voter fraud. 
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III. FEDERALISM, FEDERAL LAWS AND COMMISSIONS 
This chapter examines the role of federalism in elections, federal government 
involvement through laws and commissions, and the right of U.S. citizens to vote. The 
separation of federal and state powers affects how elections for national leaders are 
managed and how election laws, policies, and practices are constructed and carried out.  
A. FIRST, FEDERALISM 
The Tenth Amendment guarantees the powers of states and specifies that any 
power not defined in the constitution as a federal power is a state power. Further, the 
election clause within article 1, section 4, clause 1, stipulates:  
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.162 
The federal government cannot exercise its powers in a way that interferes with the 
states’ abilities to perform their responsibilities. The Constitution charges states to carry 
out presidential primaries, state primaries, and general elections, unless the states perform 
these duties in a way that conflicts with a Constitutional rule or right.163 
Constitutional violations, such as the suppression of citizen voting, have occurred 
many times over the last 228 years. In response, Congress has passed laws relating to key 
areas of the election process including prohibitions against discriminatory practices, 
fraud, and corruption.164 These federal election laws have solidified the constitutional 
right to vote for U.S. citizens and have historically focused on establishing and clarifying 
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the procedural parameters for presidential primaries, state primaries, and general 
elections to ensure election integrity.165  
B. FEDERAL ELECTION LAWS AND COMMISSIONS 
Several constitutional amendments were a result of protests or significant 
historical events, including authorizing African-American men the right to vote, granting 
women the right to vote, eliminating poll taxes, and lowering the voter age to 18 for all 
elections.166 Additionally, Congress enacted several federal laws to further protect 
constitutional rights, such as:  
 Civil Rights Act (1870, 1957, 1960, and 1964) 
 Voting Right Act of 1965; Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
(including the formation of the Federal Election Commission) 
 Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984 
 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 
 National Voter Registration Act of 1993 
 Help America Vote Act of 2002 (including the creation of the U.S. EAC 
 Military and Overseas Voting Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2009 
amending the related 1986 Act.167  
Congress established these laws to ensure free and fair elections for all citizens.168 
Additionally, these laws provide an important legal framework for federally prosecuting 
those who break election laws, such as corrupt voting officials and non-citizen voters. 
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The U.S. Constitution permits punitive laws related to national elections, and the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971 regulates the election campaign conduct.169 Provisions of 
these federal acts supersede any provision of state law dealing with federal elections.170  
When individuals violate federal law, they can be prosecuted at the federal level. 
Specifically, when an ineligible individual registers to vote for or votes in a presidential 
primary, state primary, and a general election they then may be prosecuted at the federal 
level to include Titles 18 and 42 charges for “knowingly procuring eligibility to vote by 
persons not entitled to do so,” “knowingly making a false claim of U.S. citizenship to 
vote,” and “providing false information concerning eligibility to vote in a federal 
election.”171  
Just as federal laws were created to ensure free and fair elections and standards of 
conduct, no less than four federal commissions have been established to provide best 
practices and guidance to states and candidates relating to elections. Two of these were 
created through legislation and two by executive order:  
 The Federal Election Commission was created by legislation in 1971 and 
focuses heavily on campaign financing.172  
 The EAC was formed under the Help America Vote Act in 2002 to make 
recommendations on best practices for the efficient and effective 
administration of elections, to ensure no voter suppression based on 
disabilities or English language proficiencies, as well as to guarantee 
accessibility, education, and to oversee the logistics of polling places.173 
The EAC was the first of its kind to provide federal specifications on 
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electronic devices and databases due to systemic vulnerabilities. The 
Commission has developed and maintains a voluntary voting system 
guideline, provides testing and certification of voting software and 
hardware, carries out the Help American Vote College Program, and 
provides grants to states for the procurement of voting equipment.174 The 
EAC has provided over $3.3 billion in federal funds to states and other 
eligible entities since its inception.175  
 The Presidential Commission on Election Administration was created in 
2013 by the Obama Administration to study the registration and voting 
processes used in federal elections.176 President Obama tasked the 
commission to complete a report on “laws, rules, policies, activities, 
strategies, and practices that enhance the American people’s confidence in 
the integrity of the voting processes used in federal elections. This report 
was to include the laws, rules, policies, activities, strategies, and practices 
that undermine the American people’s sureness in the integrity of the 
voting processes used in Federal elections; and those vulnerabilities in 
voting systems and practices used for Federal elections that could lead to 
improper voter registrations and improper voting, including fraudulent 
voter registrations and fraudulent voting.”177 
 Most recently, the Trump administration created the Presidential Advisory 
Commission on Election Integrity (PACEI) in May 2017.178 President 
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Trump’s executive order directed the PACEI to focus on four fundamental 
topics: voter participation, voter confidence, fraud, and voting machine 
security. After unsuccessfully gaining state voter registration data sets and 
facing multiple lawsuits, the commission was disbanded in January 2018.  
An important and recent example of federal involvement in elections occurred on 
January 6, 2017, when former DHS Director Jeh Johnson designated U.S. elections as a 
subsector of the existing government facilities critical infrastructure.179 This federal 
designation does not require states to follow critical infrastructure mandates; rather, it 
provides guidelines and support for the states with the purpose of enhancing election 
security and integrity.180  
C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE 
It took 178 years of American progression and legislation to refine just what the 
“constitutional right to vote” in federal elections requires. The U.S. Constitution mentions 
the right to vote for citizens five times, more than any other constitutional right.181 
Section One of the 14th Amendment defines U.S. citizens as “all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States.”182 Section Two imposes a fine on states that deny the 
right of U.S. citizen male residents of a state who are at least 21 years old to participate in 
any state or federal election unless they participate in rebellion or crime.183 The 15th 
Amendment states, “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
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condition of servitude.” The amendment further goes on to state Congress has the 
authority to enforce this article through criminal statutes.184 
The 19th Amendment declares, “The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
sex.”185 The “rights of citizens of the United States to vote … shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other 
tax” is specified in the 24th Amendment.186 Finally, the 26th Amendment makes states, 
“The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
age.”187  
 Who Can and Cannot Vote in General Elections 
Summarized, the following constitutional rules are used for presidential primaries, 
state primaries, and general elections:  
 Voters [of general elections] must be: 
 U.S. Citizens 
 Residents of the state and jurisdiction in which they vote 
 At least 18 years of age on or before Election Day 
 Who Cannot Vote: 
 All states have made it illegal for non-citizens to vote in general 
elections, including lawful permanent residents (also see 18 USC. 
§ 611, Voting by Aliens). 
 U.S. citizens born in U.S. territories do not have the right to vote 
for the President in the general election.  
 In some states, not be found mentally incompetent or have a felony 
conviction.188  
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IV. STATE ELECTION MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
National election administration resides at the state level and includes overseeing 
registration procedures, absentee and early voting, and management of all technical and 
non-technical Election Day processes. Millions of decentralized components make up the 
extremely complex election system; it is a system within systems. The components may 
be disparate, but all are interrelated in some fashion. Some states have standardized 
processes within their jurisdictions, while others have given local election jurisdictions 
considerable independence and discretion.  
Most of the governing law comes from the states, not Congress, and much 
authority resides in the hands of thousands of counties and municipalities 
scattered across the country. This decentralization, along with the absence 
of data by which to measure election performance, makes it extremely 
difficult to determine how well election administration is functioning in 
various jurisdictions.189  
A state may use multiple types of voting equipment used and numerous voter 
registration listings. Officials may administer policies differently in one jurisdiction than 
in another. These practices may isolate attacks against the entire system; the disparities, 
however, may also negate uniform protections.190  
A. STATE ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROCESSES 
To detect potential issues specifically regarding voter identity and eligibility 
verification, this thesis delves into the state election operations, practices, and 
capabilities. The sheer magnitude of the decentralized election system is difficult to 
fathom.  
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1. Election Infrastructure Statistics 
Approximately 10,500 local election jurisdictions exist.191 This number includes 
over 176,000 precincts and roughly 115,000–120,000 physical polling places. During the 
2016 presidential election, states operated 116,990 physical polling places.192 At these 
polling places, 25 states use electronic voter lists (sometimes called electronic poll 
books).193 Most polling places still use paper printouts of registered voters and require 
voters to present identification.194  
2. The Workers 
Nearly 920,000 poll workers were deployed for the 2016 Election Day.195 This 
massive force was responsible for verifying the identity of the voter, assisting voters with 
questions, signing registers or affidavits, issuing ballots, and overseeing the security of 
the voting process.196 The workers may serve other functions, depending on state law, 
such as setting up voting machines and other sensitive technologies.197  
3. The Machinery 
Many polling locations employ multiple voting systems, such as a scanner for 
absentee ballots and a direct recording electronic (DRE) device for in-person voting. A 
2012 survey by the EAC gathered data on almost 320,000 voting systems including 
DREs with and without a voter-verified paper audit trail option; optical or digital systems 
used to scan and tally paper ballots, hybrid systems, antiquated lever machines, common 
paper ballots, and other systems.198 The most common voting system was a combination 
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of scanned and tallied paper ballots using optical or digital scans.199 Only 18 states 
reported deploying DREs that create a paper record that voters can check, which 
enhances audit efforts.200  
4. The Voters 
Out of the roughly 313 million people who populated the United States in 2012, 
which includes adult and children citizens and non-citizens, 194 million were registered 
to vote for the 2012 presidential election.201 In other words, 62 percent of the population 
registered to vote in the 2012 elections. The remaining eligible citizens either chose not 
to register or were unable to meet the requirements for registering to vote. Of the 194 
million registered, only 131,590,825 (68 percent) of the registered voters actually 
participated in the 2012 election.202 The majority chose to cast their ballots at polling 
sites, some voted by mail, some were allowed to vote early, and some provisionally 
voted, as shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.  The 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey: Methods of 
Ballots Cast.203 
The 2012 federal election was the fifth time voters were permitted to cast a 
provisional ballot.204 Voters may receive a provisional ballot if they appear at polling 
places yet fail to have the required identification, or they may receive a provisional ballot 
if the election official challenges their eligibility due to questionable identification or 
jurisdictional concerns. In accordance with the 2002 Help America Vote Act, Section 
302(a), such voters are permitted to cast provisional ballots, which are later tallied if 
officials determine the persons are eligible to vote (eligibility verification varies by 
state).205  
Over 2.7 million provisional ballots were submitted in 2012.206 Of these, states 
reported 1.7 million provisional ballots were tallied and 180,000 were partially counted 
(for instance, some voters may have been found eligible for local elections, but not for 
federal elections). The more than 820,000 votes remaining were rejected for a variety of 
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reasons including the voter not being registered, voting in the wrong jurisdiction, the 
voter had already voted, or the voter did not sign the ballot.  
As can be seen in Figure 2, the 2016 presidential election saw an increase of 
8,523,677 more voters than in 2012, with an overall participation of 140,114,502 
voters.207 This increase represented a national turnout rate of 63 percent of the estimated 
citizen voting-age population.208  
 
Figure 2.  The 2016 Election Administration and Voting Survey: Methods of 
Ballots Cast.209 
B. VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS 
The Commission on Federal Election Reform (often referred to as the Carter-
Baker Commission) issued a study in September 2005 recommending states adopt voter 
identification requirements, along with 86 other recommendations for enhancing access 
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and election integrity.210 One recommendation was for states to verify citizenship of the 
applicant before registering the individual.211 Additionally, the Commission requested 
states not to charge voters who did not possess identification for new cards.212 Not all 
commission members agreed about verifying citizenship. Three of the commission 
members felt these practices were too rigid.213 Still, the final report states: 
The electoral system cannot inspire public confidence if no safeguard 
exists to deter or detect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters. Photo 
IDs currently are needed to board a plane, enter federal buildings, and cash 
a check. Voting is equally important.214 
In furtherance of the Commission recommendations, a bill passed the House of 
Representatives in 2006 that would have required proof of citizenship and photo 
identification to vote in federal elections; the first time proof of citizenship has ever been 
suggested in potential law.215 It would have required those without identification on 
Election Day to vote provisionally with approved identification provided within 48 hours 
for the vote to be counted.216 The 109th Senate did not address the bill before it 
adjourned. 
Despite complaints of voter disenfranchisement due to voter identification 
requirements, the number of states requiring voter identification has tripled in the past 
two decades.217 Advocates believe the requirement will prevent voter identification 
malfeasance and restore faith in U.S. elections.218 Challengers fear the requirement 
restricts the right to vote and causes a cost burden, both for the states, as well as for 
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voters.219 Voter suppression because of voter identification requirements has been the 
subject of debate for decades.  
Opponents believe costs and logistical challenges impede an eligible voter to gain 
identification, and therefore, disenfranchise eligible voters. It is reasonable to believe it 
may be more difficult for citizens who are elderly, invalid, or poor to gain identification; 
however, the severity of the burden is not clear.220  
The first Supreme Court case regarding state voter identification laws was Purcell 
v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006).221 The Court did not rule on the merits, but instead 
suggested the lower courts refrain from action shortly before Election Day.222 
Additionally, the Supreme Court opined that real or perceived voter fraud might also 
cause voter suppression.223  
In the Crawford v. Marion County (Indiana) Election Board Decision, Justice 
Stevens, a liberal Supreme Court judge who retired in 2010, articulated his belief in the 
use of photo identification and voter confidence as “safeguarding voter confidence.224 In 
this case, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of District Court Judge Barker who 
provided opinion that voters were not unduly burdened by the new state identification 
law in Indiana. Judge Barker granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgement.  
The Supreme Court has not always been consistent when dealing with the topic of 
voter identification laws. When North Carolina requested the Supreme Court consider 
overturning an appeals courts’ decision that prevented the state from enforcing a voter 
identification law, the Court denied the request.225 Similarly, in 2017, when confronted 
                                                 
219 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Voter Identification Requirements.”  
220 National Conference of State Legislatures.  
221 Tonkaji, Tokaji’s Election Law in a Nutshell, loc. 2378. 
222 Tonkaji, loc. 2378. 
223 Tonkaji, loc. 2378. 
224 Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, (Nos. 07-21 and 07-25) 472 F. 3d 949 (2008), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-21.ZO.html. 
225 Ariane de Vogue and Dan Berman, “Supreme Court Won’t Reinstate North Carolina Voter ID 
Law,” CNN, August 31, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/31/politics/supreme-court-north-carolina-
voter-id/index.html. 
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with a case in Texas, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court that voter 
identification laws were found to be discriminatory.226  
As of August 2017, 34 states have laws requesting or requiring a voter present 
identification at the polling site before receiving a ballot.227 Although identification is 
required, 19 of these states permit voting with an affidavit in lieu of identification. Table 
1 demonstrates which states require identification and which do not.  
Table 1.   Voter ID Laws as of November 2017.228 
* West Virginia and Iowa have Voter ID Laws that will go into effect in 2018 and 2019, 
respectively.  
                                                 
226 Richard Wolf, “Supreme Court Won’t Rescue Voter ID Law,” USAToday, January 23, 2017, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/23/supreme-court-texas-voter-id-law/96942738/. 
227 Fischer, Garrett, and Whitaker, State Voter Identification Requirements; National Conference of 
State Legislatures, “Voter Identification Requirements.” 
228 Adapted from National Conference of State Legislatures. Note: The information contained in Table 
1 is reflective of laws in effect as of November 2017. Additionally, it does not reflect variations in laws that 
permit provisional ballots for those without identification, if the voter provides identification within a set 
amount of time. For law specifics, see http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx 
or go to each state’s election website. 





























































Ten states strictly enforce the identification requirements. Texas enacted strict 
voter identification laws, yet they were quickly contested in state court.229 A federal 
judge ruled the Texas law discriminates against minority voters.230 As a result, Texas 
applies non-strict photo identification rules. Pennsylvania and North Carolina have 
enacted voter identification laws, but courts in each state have struck them down.231 West 
Virginia passed a voter ID law that will be implemented in 2018; Iowa passed one that 
will be implemented in 2019.  
Fourteen states permit photo or non-photo identification, for example a utility or 
bank statement with name and address for verification of eligibility.232 When a voter fails 
to provide identification in a state requiring such identification, the state generally 
permits an alternative. In non-strict states, including Colorado, Florida, Montana, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont, provisional ballots are permitted and later 
verified by some method for registration. Some non-strict states may allow voters to cast 
a ballot after signing an affidavit they are citizens and over 18. Alternatively, a poll 
worker may vouch for the eligibility of the voter.233 In stricter states, voters without 
identification are permitted to vote on a provisional ballot; however, the voter must with 
appropriate identification before the ballot is counted.234  
Common types of identification permitted for voter verification are driver’s 
licenses or non-driver cards issued by that state.235 Some states require that the 
identification reflect the voter’s current address. Sixteen states permit tribal 
identifications. If voters provide an acceptable identification, they may still be questioned 
if a name or address does not match. First-time voters who did not register in person and 
                                                 
229 National Conference of State Legislatures. 
230 National Conference of State Legislatures. 
231 National Conference of State Legislatures. 
232 National Conference of State Legislatures. 
233 National Conference of State Legislatures. 
234 National Conference of State Legislatures.  
235 National Conference of State Legislatures. 
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have not already provided proof of identification are required by federal law to show 
some form of identification.236 
The successes and pitfalls of voter identification laws are hard to determine. 
Demonstrating whether voter identification prevents deception or whether identification 
laws are unduly burdensome is difficult. The controversy of voter identification 
requirements will likely to be a continued hot topic for years to come.237  
C. STATE VOTER REGISTRATION SURVEY 
Between October and December 2017, 51 surveys were sent to each state and the 
District of Columbia senior election official(s).238 The survey consisted of seven election 
process questions with multiple-choice answers, as well as areas for the election officials 
to provide additional details relating to the state’s procedures. Out of 51 requests, 24 
states responded: Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming. Twenty-two states completed the form and provided the 
response via email; Maryland requested to respond to the questions by phone, and North 
Dakota provided a written response in the body of an email as the state has no voter 
registration system and felt an email was a more appropriate response. Each response and 
statistical reporting is available in Appendix B. 
 Question 1: What documents are required to show proof of in terms of age 
and residency to become a registered voter?”  
The responder had the choice of selecting from driver’s license, birth certificate, 
no identification needed, naturalization certificate, or other state approved documents. 
Respondents could choose one or as many as were appropriate. Fifteen out of the 24 
                                                 
236 “Voter ID Requirements,” USA.gov, accessed December 3, 2017, www.usa.gov/voter-id. 
237 Fischer, Garrett, and Whitaker, State Voter Identification Requirements. 
238 Note: names and addresses were gained from the National Association of State Election 
Directors, “National Association of State Election Directors Roster.”  
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states that responded declared no proof of identification was required at the time of 
registration. Six of the states accepted driver’s licenses as proof of eligibility.  
 Question 2: How does the state verify citizenship for voting? 
Out of the 24 respondents, 18 states responded they rely on affirmation only for 
citizenship and trust the voter to be truthful. This reliance appears to be typical for all 
states and is indicative of the National Voter Registration Act form. In Iowa, citizenship 
is not verified except by oath when a voter registers. North Dakota utilizes driver’s 
licenses, specifically relying on their Real ID Act identification that differentiates 
between citizen and non-citizen. Utah verifies the individual’s social security number 
along with a driver’s license; social security numbers are issued to individuals not 
eligible to vote, however, so other ways would be needed to verify citizenship.  
 Question 3: How often does your state perform statewide voter roll 
maintenance (address changed, name changes, additions and 
verifications)? 
Twenty-one states out of the 24 responders stated they update their voter 
registration list continuously. In Iowa, the frequency of maintenance depends on the type 
of maintenance needed (see Iowa Code 48A). In Louisiana, election officials perform an 
annual screening of the rolls. Louisiana updates the voter rolls when notifications are 
provided by the voter, by a piece of returned mail, by notice of registration in another 
state, and monthly updates for death and felon information. Discussed in detail in the 
Voter Registration section, North Dakota is the only state that does not maintain a voter 
registration list.  
 Question 4: What resources does your state use for managing the 
statewide voter roll? 
Twenty-one out of 24 states that responded state they use mail out letters or 
postcards, the most prevalent method of the various resources listed. Nine states out of 
the responding 24 states use the Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program 
(Crosscheck) to help keep their voter rolls updated and nine states use Electronic 
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Registration Information Center (ERIC). In comparison with actual percentages for 
overall states, 58 percent of the states utilize Crosscheck and 41 percent use ERIC. Figure 
3 depicts the most common resources for managing voter rolls. 
 
Figure 3.  State Voter Registration Survey: Resources Used to Manage Voter 
Rolls. 
Massachusetts responded by stating each city and town conducts an annual street 
listing. Election officials mail a census card to every household. The results are used to 
update the voter registration lists. Voters who fail to return the street listing are sent a 
confirmation notice and then placed on the inactive voter list. The State of Kansas uses 
jury list notifications, the state Department of Vital Statistics and Department of 
Corrections databases, and the National Change of Address for registry maintenance. 
Rhode Island utilizes duplicate reports from their voter registration database and receives 
monthly reports from the Rhode Island Department of Health death records and the 
Rhode Island Adult Correction Institution felon records. 
 Question 5: What occurs when a non-citizen, an individual living in a 
different state, or otherwise ineligible person is detected and confirmed 
during voter registration or maintenance? 
Nineteen of the 24 responding states contact the individual to allow the individual 














their listing and 13 of the states remove the individual from the list, generally upon 
confirmation from the individual or if the individual fails to respond.  
Massachusetts stated that this question was difficult to respond to as it depended 
on the situation. The only way voters on the Massachusetts registration list are removed 
is if the voters confirm their ineligibility in writing. If the voters have moved to another 
state, the voters need to confirm in writing before being removed.  
In Idaho, once verification is complete on any ineligible person on its voter roster, 
the information is turned over to the county prosecutor for potential investigation. In 
Iowa, non-citizen cases are handled differently from non-residency cases; generally, the 
voter is made inactive. Georgia responded that different reactions can happen, but some 
form of hearing or investigation is common. In Rhode Island, the local Board of 
Canvassers examines the issue and may contact the voter. If the review concludes the 
individuals do not belong on the list, they are removed. Criminal cases may be forwarded 
to the police for investigation. If Wyoming officials receive out-of-state cancellations, the 
voter is inactivated on their rolls. 
 Question 6: If your state offers mail-in registration and mail-in voting, 
does your state check identification and at what point? 
Thirteen of the 24 states that offer mail-in registration and mail-in voting check 
ID prior to the vote being counted. Eight of the states require the voter to submit a copy 
of the ID with the registration form. Four states have the voters submit a copy of their ID 
with their ballot. In New Jersey and West Virginia, no voter identification is needed for 
mail-in registration and voting.  
Several states use driver license numbers and portions of the social security 
number to verify identity, such as Idaho, Rhode Island, and Iowa. These methods do not 
verify citizenship eligibility, however, as many temporary workers, students, and other 
non-citizens can gain these identification cards as well.  
Massachusetts responded that people applying by mail must include their driver’s 
license number, and if they had none, they were to supply the last four digits of their 
 58
social security numbers. These identification numbers would be verified. If they did not 
provide the numbers, their record would be flagged to show identification the first time 
they vote. In Louisiana, the voters are required to vote in person the first time to provide 
photo identification or a voter affidavit. First time registrants in New York State must 
have their identifications verified before voting. 
 Question 7: Who prosecutes voter fraud in your state? 
According to their responses, as shown in Table 2, five states handle it at the 
county prosecution level only: Hawaii, Illinois, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
Delaware only handles it at the state level, and West Virginia handles it at the state or 
federal level. Seven states prosecute at the county and state levels and six states will 
consider prosecution at all three levels: county, state, and federal. 
Table 2.   State Voter Registration Survey: Who Prosecutes Voter Fraud in Your 
State? 
State County State Federal 
DE  
GA239    
HI  
IA  






MA241   
MD   
MS   
MT   
                                                 
239 Georgia elections are generally regulated by the State Board of Elections (SEB). The SEB is the 
usual source of sanctions (civil penalties only) for election violations, but violations may also be prosecuted 
in county and federal court. It is rare for criminal prosecutions to occur, but it happens in some cases. 
240 In Louisiana, the County District Attorney (DA) generally prosecutes voter fraud. The DA may 
recuse to the Attorney General. If the election is federal, the person may be federally prosecuted. 
241 In Massachusetts, the state Attorney General, the DA, or the U.S. Attorney could prosecute 
violations of election law. 
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State County State Federal 
ND 
 













20 16 9 
  
                                                 
242 In Rhode Island, investigations are conducted by local Boards of Canvassers (Board of Elections) 
and any case of voter fraud is handled by the state police and Attorney General. 
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V. VERIFICATION CHALLENGES 
The first half of the thesis documented the evidence and implications of voter 
fraud, related federal statutes, and predominant policies and practices of the states. It also 
took an in-depth look at the responses to the voter registration survey. Although not all 
states replied, nearly half responded with valuable information. Additionally, the 
previous chapter explained the massive infrastructure of the U.S. election system and 
described the various policies and practices in place.  
Chapter V lists obvious problems in available statistics and lists common methods 
for verifying voter identity and eligibility. It exposes vulnerabilities in each process and 
sets a foundation for the potential of ineligible individuals being listed on voter 
registration lists and the subsequent opportunity for fraudulent voting to aid in answering 
research question number one. By knowing and understanding the strengths and 
limitations of available data and verification practices, research question number two is 
also answered by establishing that gaps exist in current mythologies. 
A. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REFLECTS FEWER VOTERS THAN THOSE 
REGISTERED 
It would be impossible to have a detailed understanding of the election system 
and potential vulnerabilities without understanding available statistics. Election statistics 
help determine how many voters the nation has, how many citizens are eligible to vote, 
and how many individuals reside in a particular jurisdiction. Election data matters to 
social scientists, economists, legislators, jurists, politicians, and election officials. Having 
accurate data should also matter to the American public, as numbers help analyze fairness 
and accuracy. 
John Shott, chair for the Judiciary Committee of the West Virginia House of 
Delegates, expressed concern over voter fraud when editors of Canvass interviewed him 
on May 6, 2016. “While we don’t have many reported cases of voter fraud,” he 
explained, “some of our statistics indicated that the number of registered voters on the 
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rolls exceeded the Census numbers for that community. We felt that a voter ID 
requirement would be helpful in rebuilding that confidence and trust.”243  
West Virginia is not the only state whose registrations reportedly exceed census 
numbers. Over the last 20 years, counties in Ohio, Missouri, and Colorado, amongst other 
states, have reported more registered voters in an area than the estimated census voting-
age population.244 This number may simply be a result of inaccurate registration lists or 
errors in estimations. The number of discrepancies, however, may be an indication of 
other types of liabilities.  
Logically, less people should be registered to vote in a given area than the number 
of residents for that same area. For example, it is an obvious concern to have statistics 
representing more registered voters than the citizen voting-age population (CVAP) in a 
given county, let alone more than the voting-age population, which includes individuals 
not eligible to vote.245 According to Election Data Services, which has collected 
extensive data of election statistics and census demographics for nearly three decades, 
241 counties in 2016 registered more than 100 percent of the voting-age population in 
that county.246 In the same year, more than 100 percent of the CVAP in 351 counties had 
registered.247  
The EAC produces its election administration and voting survey every two years. 
This survey provides a holistic picture of what is going on with U.S. elections and breaks 
elections down into various categories to include by state, by voting methods (polling 
site, mail-voting, provisional, etc.), and voter turnout. EAC’s 2016 election 
                                                 
243 John Shott, “NCSL’s the Canvass: May 2016,” National Conference of State Legislatures, 
accessed November 24, 2017, https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/the-canvass-may-
2016.aspx. 
244 Aaron Gardener, “Colorado Counties Have More Voters than People,” Media Trackers, September 
4, 2012, http://mediatrackers.org/2012/09/04/colorado-counties-have-more-voters-than-people/. 
245 Note: citizen voting-age population and voting-age populations are terms used by the U.S. Census 
Bureau and are defined in “Redistricting Data: Voting Age Population by Citizenship and Race (CVAP),” 
U.S. Census Bureau, accessed December 2, 2017, https://www.census.gov/rdo/data/voting_age_popula 
tion_by_citizenship_and_race_cvap.html. 
246 Kimball Brace, “The Election Process: From a Data Prospective” (presentation, Election Data 
Services, Inc., 2017), https://www.electiondataservices.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/BracePresenta 
tion2PenseCommAmended.pdf. 
247 Brace.  
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administration and voting survey reveals that nine states registered more voters than their 
total CVAP for that same year as determined by the U.S. Census Bureau.248 Some states 
repeatedly have more registrations than CVAP estimates. See Table 3. 










% of CVAP 
 
Alaska 523,747 587,303 112.13 
California 24,280,349 24,486,638 100.85 
Colorado 3,750,953 3,840,303 102.38 
D.C. 485,116 493,287 101.68 
Indiana 4,801,113 4,839,038 100.79 
Kentucky 3,297,108 3,306,120 100.27 
Maine 1,048,274 1,065,100 101.61 
Michigan 7,380,136 7,514,055 101.81 
New York 13,531,404 16,200,892 119.73 
Totals 59,098,200 62,332,736 Diff: 3,234,536 
 
At first glance, Table 3 demonstrates more voters were registered in states than 
residing in those states, which may be because states keep inactive voters who have 
moved on their voting lists. In calculating the differences, it appears three million more 
voters are registered than should reasonably be in those states. Could these apparent 
discrepancies permit the opportunity for fraud to occur? If so, keeping accurate and clean 
voter lists could mitigate a gap.  
As election expert Charles Stewart III states, “The geographic churn in the 
American adult population creates a record-keeping challenge for the system of voter 
registration in the United States.”250 If discrepancies allow the chance for fraud, then 
                                                 
248 Election Assistance Commission, The Election Administration and Voting Survey: 2016 
Comprehensive Report, 55–66. 
249 Adapted from Election Assistance Commission, 55–66. 




finding a method to shore up voter lists and efficiently manage them is critical in 
preventing fraud.  
It is accurate to say the Census Bureau’s annual figures are estimates only; 
meaning, they are not precise. The Census Bureau estimates voting-age populations and 
citizen voting-age populations, which are two different yet important numbers.251 
Voting-age populations include all non-citizen and citizen individuals who are 18 years 
of age and older residing in a specific jurisdiction.252  
Citizen voting-age population estimates are determined through American 
community surveys (ACSs) in which individuals are asked whether they are U.S. 
citizens.253 This question is important as it is currently the only method for learning the 
numbers of U.S. citizens in a given area. Using surveys to determine the numbers of 
citizens is a poor way of collecting this data. Not all solicited individuals would choose to 
complete a lengthy survey, but those who do may not be truthful in fear of retribution for 
any illegal status. Another issue is that the Census Bureau’s estimates of voting-age and 
citizen voting-age populations do not account for the approximate 221,000 armed forces 
members and their families serving overseas.254  
Gaining accurate numbers of eligible voters and the number who actually 
participated in an election is impossible with current methods. Numbers are important, 
however, as they play into many aspects of electoral integrity. These numbers include 
identifying how many eligible citizens are voting or not, which can help with 
understanding voter participation and turnout and allow focus on low-participating 
jurisdictions to promote citizenry voting. Likewise, learning that more voters are 
registered in a particular area than appears in census information is an indicator of 
                                                 
251 U.S. Census Bureau, “Redistricting Data.”  
252 U.S. Census Bureau.  
253 U.S. Census Bureau, “American Community Survey Information Guide,” 7, accessed December 3, 
2017, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/about/information-guide.html. 
254 Brace, “The Election Process: From a Data Prospective”; “Monthly Population Estimates,” U.S. 
Census Bureau, accessed December 2, 2017, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/nation-
total.html. 
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potential discrepancies. If the numbers were more reliable, negating or substantiating 
fraud might be feasible.  
Incorporating strong verification processes helps build trust and can help with 
data accuracy. Voter numbers play into electoral re-districting, where susceptibility to 
fraud is a concern. Inaccurate numbers can lead to inaccurately apportioned districts, 
which may obscure voter fraud.  
To further the point, the Tables 4–6 present leading source data on 2016 voters.  
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2016 323,128 21,443 245,502 227,019 157,596 137,537 
 
                                                 
255 Adapted from Election Assistance Commission, The Election Administration and Voting Survey: 
2016 Comprehensive Report, 21, 39. 
256 Adapted from U.S. Census Bureau, “Monthly Population Estimates”; “Reported Voting and 
Registration of the Citizen Voting-Age Population: November 2016,” U.S. Census Bureau, accessed 
December 2, 2017, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-
580.html; “Electorate Profiles: Selected Characteristics of the Citizen, Voting-Age Population,” U.S. 
Census Bureau, accessed December 2, 2017, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-
and-registration/electorate-profiles-2016.html. 
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231,000  139,062 
 
What amount of variation is risk-tolerable? Having the estimates vary by millions 
is problematic and creates doubt in system integrity.  
Unless methodologies are refined, the challenges of gathering precise statistics 
will only grow due to expected U.S. population growth. Currently, the U.S. population 
now exceeds 326 million. This nation’s population has doubled in the past 50 years. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the population could rise another 132 million to 
458 million by 2050.258 The annual U.S. immigrant intake is expected to nearly double in 
the next 50 years.259 Verifying identities and voter eligibility may become more and more 
difficult unless stakeholders determine ways to gather accurate numbers and reliable 
verification methods now.260 Currently, no dependable way exists to discern the number 
of citizens residing in any given U.S. jurisdiction who are eligible to vote in a U.S. 
election. According to the EAC, “There has to be a process for ensuring that only eligible 
individuals vote and that each person only votes once.”261  
By having accurate statistics, officials and researchers can categorize and find 
incongruities. Researchers could review jurisdictions where eligible voters are not voting 
to determine influences and solutions. Having precise data will allow assessments that 
can be used to discern whether U.S. laws and policies have enabled all eligible citizens to 
                                                 
257 Adapted from Michael McDonald, “America Goes to the Polls: A Report on Voter Turnout in the 
2016 Election,” Non-Profit Vote, 6, March 24, 2017, http://www.nonprofitvote.org/america-goes-to-the-
polls-2016/. 
258 Jennifer M. Ortman and Christine E. Guarneri, United States Population Projections: 2000 to 2050 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, Government Printing Office, 2009), 2, http://www.census.gov/pop 
ulation/projections/files/analytical-document09.pdf. 
259 Ortman and Guarneri. 
260 “U.S. and World Population Clock,” U.S. Census Bureau, accessed December 2, 2017, https:// 
www.census.gov/popclock/. 
261 Election Assistance Commission, The Election Administration and Voting Survey: 2016 
Comprehensive Report, 37. 
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vote, and prevented ineligible individuals from voting. Ultimately, accurate election and 
voter statistics help measure the strength of democracy in the United States.  
B. APPREHENSIONS ABOUT VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS 
As with every constitutional right, the right for a citizen to vote is subject to 
reasonable expectations for verifying eligibility for that right.262 Unfortunately, state 
legislation, courts, and even the Supreme Court justices do not agree what reasonable 
means when it comes to proving eligibility. Nor do legislatures and courts agree what 
might be construed as excessively burdensome to the point that eligible voters are 
prevented from voting (voter suppression).263 With these challenges, gaining consensus 
and establishing best and fair practices for verifying eligibility is challenging. 
Many states have strengthened their voter identification requirements in the past 
few years in attempt to curb fraud. Two-thirds of states require a voter present acceptable 
identification before being voting at the polls.264 Included in a decision regarding adding 
additional proof-of-citizenship requirements on national mail voter registration forms, the 
EAC shared comments from responders stating that adding the requirements “would limit 
and suppress the vote of certain classes of disadvantaged Americans, would make the 
voting process more restrictive, would discourage legitimate voters from voting, and 
were otherwise unnecessary.”265  
Those who oppose identification laws say they disenfranchise minorities and 
alienate the poor.266 In 2015, the University of California, San Diego found “strict photo 
identification laws have a differentially negative impact on the turnout of Hispanics, 
Blacks, and mixed-race Americans in primaries and general elections.”267 Opponents 
believe identification cards are costly, require taking time off work, and are a burden for 
                                                 
262 Election Assistance Commission. 
263 Doug Linder, “Exploring Constitutional Conflicts: Equal Protection and the Right to Vote,” 2016, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/righttovote.html. 
264 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Voter Identification Requirements|Voter ID Laws.” 
265 Miller, Memorandum of Decision, 10. 
266 Barry and Newman, “Could Fingerprinting Finish the Debate Over Voter ID Laws?”  
267 Newkirk, “How Voter ID Laws Discriminate.”  
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traveling to a county or state government office, which causes inconvenience.268 Non-
supporters have described these laws as “Jim Crow 2.0” voter suppression polices.269 
These groups suggest that photo identification laws may cause more harm as much as 
they do good.270  
Paul Gronke, political science expert, writes, “the requirement for ID alone shows 
a weak but negative association with voter confidence, while the additional photo ID 
requirement displays a mildly positive relationship.”271 Similarly, Steven Levitsky and 
Daniel Ziblatt, authors of How Democracies Die, find that even a modest effect of voter 
suppression due to strict voter identification laws may negatively impact the outcome of 
elections.272 Their research concedes that most studies find the effects appear to be 
minor. Still, suppression of eligible voters is antidemocratic.273  
Much of the debate on voter identification centers on preventing fraud while 
protecting voter rights. Public opinion surveys have regularly found support for voter 
identification requirements at the time of voting.274 Additionally, in a PEW Research 
Center survey, participants were asked if they had the required identification. Ninety-
eight percent said they did.275 In other studies, researchers found a wider range of 80–95 
percent of survey participants had the required identification.276  
                                                 
268 Newkirk. 
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The following bullets list typical voter registration requirements to prove 
eligibility. By submitting one of these documents during voter registration, a voter would 
meet the usual state voter registration requirement:277 Only one of the listed documents is 
required for voter registration:  
 Current or valid photo ID 
 Current utility bill 
 Bank statement 
 Government check  
 Paycheck  
 Other government document that shows your name and address 
 Birth certificate 
 Native American tribal document 
 Other proof of United States citizenship (birth certificate, naturalization 
certificate, or U.S. passports)278  
Charles Stewart III, distinguished professor at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, conducted a survey in the days following the 2012 presidential election via 
Yougov on the internet.279 He surveyed 200 registered voters via internet in each of the 
50 states and District of Columbia for a total sample size of 10,200.280 This survey 
focused on questions surrounding the voter experience to include voter identification 
requirements.281 Stewart found states appear to inequitably implement voter 
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278 Vote.org. 
279 Charles Stewart III, 2012 Survey of the Performance of American Elections (Cambridge: MA: The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013) executive summary, https://elections.delaware.gov/pdfs/SP 
AE_2012.pdf. 
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identification laws, which is problematic and might lead to discriminatory practices.282 
“Black and Hispanic voters were asked to show “picture ID” more often than White 
voters.”283 However, when asked about election reform, 71 percent of the participants 
supported photo identification requirements when voting.284  
Stewart also conducted another survey at mid-terms in 2014. In each of the 2012 
and 2014 surveys, he asked the participants about the identification they possessed. The 
respondents most commonly held birth certificates and driver’s licenses, as shown in 
Table 7.  
Table 7.   Possession of Identification Cards. 
Identification 2012285 2014286 
Official Copy of a Birth Certificate 89% 84% 
Driver’s License 91% 93% 
U.S. Passport 41% 46% 
Other form of Government ID 16% 15% 
Photo ID issued by Out-of-State Government 11% 7% 
In-state Public University ID Card 10% 9% 
Voter Registration Card 62% 57% 
 
From this study, it appears that most voters possess the required identification 
needed at the time of voting. Like other areas of this study, more empirical information is 
needed to understand any negative influences of voter identification laws better. 
However, if disparate implementation across jurisdictions allows certain groups to be 
asked for identification, while others are not, then this request creates unfair practices that 
can disenfranchise voters. 
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C. CHALLENGES WITH VOTER IDENTIFICATION 
Verifying identity at the polling place on Election Day can be a challenge.287 
Verifying authenticity of documents by the polling or registration official is an unrealistic 
expectation, as most of these individuals are volunteers and not experts in detecting 
fraudulent documents. All states requiring voter identification except North Dakota 
accept non-photo identification, such as birth certificates, social security cards, bank 
statements, and utility bills.  
Presenting a utility bill for showing jurisdiction is fine however, using a utility bill 
or social security card, amongst other permitted documents, as a means to demonstrate 
proof of voter eligibility should stop, as these documents are available to most individuals 
present within the nation and fictitious documents are easily created.288 These documents 
do not really verify voter eligibility. Most individuals present within the United States are 
legally able to gain these forms of identification, including non-citizens. Driver’s licenses 
and social security numbers are issued to citizens and often to non-citizens as well, 
including those legally present for employment or school.    
D. VERIFYING U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
In accordance with federal and state laws, only U.S. citizens may vote in general 
elections for national leaders. Advocates of citizenship verification state it is necessary to 
ensure integrity in the voting process to avoid fraudulent non-citizen voting.289 “Critics 
say requiring proof of citizenship, such as a birth certificate or passport, to register to 
vote disenfranchises college students, low-income people, and minorities.”290 Like voter 
                                                 
287 USA.gov, “Voter ID Requirements.”  
288 Social Security Administration, Social Security Cards for Non-Citizens (Washington, DC: 
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289 Ana Henderson, “Web Special: Citizenship Verification, Obstacle to Voter Registration and 
Participation,” New Political Spaces 19, no. 1 (2012): 122, http://www.reimaginerpe.org/book/export/ 
html/6967; Morley, “Dismantling the Unitary Electoral System?” 
290 Ariella Phillips, “Head of Trump’s Voter Fraud Panel Sought More Flexibility for States to Impose 
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identification laws, requiring proof of citizenship for elections is another hotly debated 
topic.  
Neither law nor procedure requires voters to show proof of U.S. citizenship to 
register or to vote in national elections. It appears that states do not systematically verify 
citizenship from state or federal databases, either. Frankly, the states do not have the tools 
they need to verify citizenship. Substantial gaps exist between what the federal law 
requires (a voter in a national election must be a U.S. citizen) and verification that the law 
is being met.  
Registering to vote does not require proof of U.S. citizenship.291 According to the 
EAC’s interpretation of the National Voter Registration Act (Title 42 § 1973gg-6(a)(1)), 
“Absent any evidence in the state’s possession that contradicts the specific information 
on the voter registration application, to which the applicant has attested under penalty of 
perjury, the registration official should accept the sworn affirmation as sufficient proof of 
the applicant’s eligibility and register that applicant to vote.”292 Little support is available 
concerning actual verification of eligibility with the exception of a good faith statement 
by the registering voters affirming they are eligible.  
It might be easier if researchers and officials had reliable data on the number of 
citizens and non-citizens who reside or are currently present in the United States. The 
numbers can be crudely estimated, however. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates the U.S. 
population to be just over 326 million at the time of this writing. Of the 323,127,515 
population of December 2016, 25.5 percent or 82,397,516 were 19 and under (meaning 
most were ineligible to vote by age; the Census Bureau did not show the voting age 
population in this chart).293 Thus, 240,729,999 of the U.S. population are adults (both 
                                                 
291 Election Assistance Commission, Register to Vote in Your State by Using This Postcard Form and 
Guide Voter Registration Card (Silver Spring, MD: Election Assistance Commission, 2006), https://www. 
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292 Election Assistance Commission, 37 (see footnote 18). 
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citizens and non-citizens). For non-citizens, this number includes legal immigrants who 
are lawful permanent residents (LPRs), nonimmigrant residents in the United States who 
are in this country for the duration of status of their visas (such as students and temporary 
workers), visitors for business or pleasure, and those who are illegally present or who 
have remained in the United States past the expiration of their visas. These individuals 
are not eligible to vote in national elections, yet many of these individuals (those who are 
LPRs or in this nation legally for a duration of time) have social security numbers and 
driver’s licenses. Foreign-born individuals are issued social security numbers when they 
are authorized to work or go to school in the United States, which includes immigrants, 
and non-immigrant types encompassing foreign workers and students. They are also 
granted driver’s licenses to carry out their work or school.  
Verifying citizenship, unfortunately, is not simple. Only a few ways exist to 
verify the citizenship of a voter; by the voter submitting proof of citizenship 
documentation when registering or by state and local election officials verifying 
citizenship through electronic means. If the responsibility to confirm citizenship status is 
required of the state’s election officials, they would need the ability to verify citizenship 
with the place of birth in the United States, whether in the same state or another state, 
citizenship through naturalization, or derived citizenship.294  
If first time voters are asked to provide proof of U.S. citizenship for voter 
registration, several documents can be provided. The following list is based upon what 
the Department of State requires for passport eligibility and what the U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires for proof of citizenship for U.S. citizen 
petitioners: 
 U.S. birth certificate 
 Department of State issue U.S. passport or passport number 
 Department of State Consular Report of Birth Abroad, or FS-240 
                                                 
294 Note: There are two ways to obtain derived citizenship through U.S. citizen parents: one at birth 
from U.S. citizen parents and one after birth, before the age of eighteen after the parents naturalize. For 
more information, see USCIS Policy Manual guidance on Children of U.S. Citizens. 
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 U.S. naturalization certificate or certificate of citizenship issued by the 
USCIS 
 Other documents issued by the federal government pursuant to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 
 Bureau of Indian Affairs card 
 American Indian card, issued by the DHS 
 Final adoption decree showing the applicant’s name and U.S. birthplace 
 U.S. military record of service showing applicant’s place of birth in the 
United States 
 Extract from a U.S. hospital record of birth created at the time of the 
applicant’s birth indicating the applicant’s place of birth in the United 
States295 
Non-citizens present in the United States typically have all the usual or standard 
identification forms with the exception of a valid state-issued birth certificate or 
naturalization certificate. Documents may be altered, fraudulently produced, or 
fraudulently gained.296 The Department of Health and Human Services produced a report 
in September 2000 stating that fraudulent birth certificates are easy to obtain.297 As of 
                                                 
295 “Proof of U.S. Citizenship and Identification When Applying for a Job,” U.S. Citizenship and 
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2000, over 6,422 different entities issued birth certificates in the states.298 The differing 
of standards and access to computers, scanners, and good printers creates a vulnerability 
for relying on presented documents. 
People might think it ideal that both should happen, the voter and the state being 
equally committed in proving eligibility. Submitted documents can be fraudulent, 
dishonestly gained, altered, or completely fake. If local and state officials reviewing 
documents are not well-trained in spotting fraudulent or fake documents, they can miss 
indicators of fraud. The best way of verifying information appears to be when 
government entities have a viable means to confirm information from original sources. 
This verification mitigates fraud and may reduce the voter’s burden. An argument can be 
made that having applicants produce documents can be unduly burdensome. They may 
have lost the original documents during a disaster or it may be inconvenient or costly to 
gain them. If officials relied more on systemic verification, would this prevent 
disenfranchisement while ensuring eligibility is verified? Fortunately, several systems 
exist that can help verify citizenship and voter eligibility.  
In 2014, Jess T. Richman, Gulshan A. Chattha, and David C. Earnest used a 
nationwide sampling from the 2008 and 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election 
Studies via data gained from internet-based surveys.299 The survey questionnaire listed 
over 100 questions ranging from election participation, preferences, and candidate 
choices. Over 32,800 responses were obtained in 2008 and 55,400 in 2010 offering an 
enormous data set for researchers. The survey did not focus on non-citizen voting or 
election fraud, but did ask pointed questions including citizenship status.300 For the 2008 
survey, participation was verified for at least some individuals in every state to help 
confirm the reliability of the data.301 Richman, Chattha, and Earnest concluded, “Most 
non-citizens did not register or vote in 2008, but some did. The proportion of non-citizens 
who [claimed to have] voted was less than fifteen percent, but significantly greater than 
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zero. Similarly in 2010 we found that more than three percent of non-citizens reported 
voting.”302 Does this survey provide evidence non-citizens voted. The proof is in the 
registration data and the actual votes, so these numbers are indicators only.  
Most states rely on voter affirmation where the voter affirms under penalty of 
perjury they meet the qualifications of an eligible voter. On a voter registration 
application form, applicants would need to affirm they are a U.S. citizen and at least 18 
years old as of the Election Day.303 In other words, the nation relies on good faith that the 
voters are honest and not willing to misrepresent themselves to cast a vote. Affirmation 
may be sufficient for some, but it may cast doubt with others if eligibility is not verified 
and confirmed. The burden of proof is on the state registration official, and not the 
individual who claims to be a U.S. citizen. 
1. Verifying Birth in the United States 
Verifying birth certificates is likely impossible unless the voters were born within 
the state in which they are registering.304 Although it might be easy for a state to verify 
the birth for voters born within their state, states and territories do not share each other’s 
vital records databases, which could help determine birth in another state. Name changes 
can affect the ability to do so in an efficient manner. Research demonstrates fraudulent 
birth certificates are easy to obtain.305 With the technology available today on a typical 
laptop, fraudulent birth certificates and fake documents are not overly difficult to 
produce.306 In 2000, over 6,422 different entities within the states issued birth certificates 
and over 14,000 were different versions of certificates in circulation.307  
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Instead of having an election or driver’s license official review provided birth 
certificates, the nation can leverage from systems that hold this information. Just as 
naturalized or derived citizenship can be verified through the USCIS systematic alien 
verification for entitlements (SAVE) program, birth or adoption in the United States can 
be verified through systems as well.  
For birth certificates, it might be easy for a state to verify the birth for voters born 
within their state; states and territories rarely appear to share each other’s vital records 
databases, which could help determine birth in another state.308 Name changes can affect 
the ability to do so in an efficient manner as well, unless the registration form requests 
and gains previous names used (aliases), such as a maiden name.  
Birth and death records can be verified through a national system called EVVE or 
electronic verification of vital events.309 EVVE is a protected repository operated by the 
National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems.310 It provides 
federal and state agencies the ability to establish proof of age, citizenship, and eligibility 
for employment, services, and benefit applicants.311 
Queries may be run individually or in batch queries, which enable efficiencies. 
The request is queried against the specified jurisdiction’s vital records data. Results from 
the query are provided back to the client to show either a confirmed match or no match. 
Any no match should be treated as an indicator only. Confirmation should be made with 
the voter applicants for them to assist in resolving any information. This method will 
certainly expose those using fraudulently made or altered birth certificates. Limitations 
do exist however as it appears that New York and Texas do not participate in sharing 
information on vital records.  
Additionally, verifying voter death information through EVVE FOD (fact of 
death) would corroborate the information received from another source and strengthen 
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the process to ensure no voter is inadvertently removed through record discrepancies in 
the death index. 
2. Verifying Naturalized and Derived Citizenship 
To verify citizenship of those foreign-born, it is valuable for state and local 
election officials to have access to federal databases. A previously mentioned system is 
the USCIS SAVE, provided for by section 404 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 3009-664) to vet the lawful presence of 
a person in the United States.312 This DHS system was designed for inter-government 
usage for assisting benefit-granting agencies in determining an individual’s status in the 
United States.313 Over 100 million records are accessible through this program, which 
permits a strong verification system for status in the United States for those applying for 
benefits through the legal immigration system.314 The SAVE program provides a secure 
verification service for these purposes. Perhaps the program could be extended for 
naturalized citizen voter verification.315 
As of 2017, 100 agencies across the United States are utilizing the SAVE program 
for secure and quick citizenship verification.316 The system, designed initially for public 
benefits, has greatly expanded service to include usage for agencies that conduct federal 
security clearance background investigations, social security benefits, driver’s licenses, 
housing benefits, state and local government verification and occupational and 
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professional licensing.317 The REAL ID Act requires the use of the SAVE program for 
routine verifications; however, neither SAVE nor the REAL ID Act programs are 
federally required for voter identity verification.318  
Improving the ability to ensure eligibility in voter lists is needed according to the 
Presidential Commission on Election Administration report dated January 2014.319 The 
SAVE program could aid in this effort. The SAVE program can verify those with a non-
immigrant status, immigrant status, U.S. citizenship for naturalized citizens, and U.S. 
citizenship for derived citizens.320 Cross-referencing a state’s voter registration rolls 
against such databases is valuable, increases integrity, and bolsters trust in the system. 
SAVE “does not make determinations on any applicant’s eligibility for a benefit or 
license.”321 The results do not definitively establish that a person is ineligible to vote 
either; however it provides sufficient grounds for requesting confirmation of voter 
eligibility directly from the voter.322  
The SAVE program appears to have two major flaws at this time for voter 
verification, however. To look up individuals in the system, the alien file or the 
naturalization certificate number issued by the DHS is needed.323 Searches are conducted 
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one at a time, and not via batch verification. For these two reasons, the SAVE database is 
neither an effective, nor efficient system to use for verification purposes. An alien 
number is required and verifying one record at a time is not an effective or pragmatic use 
of system capabilities. This flaw hinders an efficient verification program. Perhaps, the 
SAVE program could be enhanced to allow searches on basic search criteria, such as full 
first name, full last name, date of birth, and the last four numbers of the individual’s 
social security number, as well as aliases (maiden name). To be truly innovative, the 
SAVE program should be enhanced to allow batch processing by a state in the normal 
course of its voter registration list maintenance to allow for effective identity matching 
and create efficiencies to strengthen the voter verification process. Any results showing a 
possible discrepancy is an indicator only and should be treated as a possible issue that 
needs resolution, such as outreach to the individuals to afford them the opportunity to 
establish their eligibility through proof of documentation.  
E. THE REAL ID ACT AND VOTER VERIFICATION 
A voter identity verification program some election officials rely on is the Real ID 
Act—Title II, passed by Congress in 2005 and enacted from the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendation. The use of REAL ID compliant cards is thought to be sufficient to 
show citizenship for the card bearers. It is true that to gain a card, proof of citizenship or 
lawful presence in the United States and in their residency in the state is required. 
Regardless of an individual’s status in the United States (citizen or non-citizen), an 
individual may qualify for a REAL ID driver or non-driver’s license. The Act requires 
the states to verify the status, to include checking the USCIS SAVE program.324 No 
federal requirement exists, however, for states to imprint the status of an individual 
(citizen or non-citizen) on the REAL ID card itself to equip officials viewing the cards.325  
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As background, the REAL ID Act compels states to issue identification 
documents, including driver’s licenses, which conform to minimum security standards.326 
Since 2008, federal entities are barred from accepting state-issued identification cards 
that do not meet the REAL ID Act standards unless the state has been granted compliance 
extension.327 REAL ID Act cards are required for travel through federally regulated 
transit stations including airports, as well as access into federal buildings or onto federal 
installations.  
The DHS has deemed 30 states REAL ID Act compliant.328 Sixteen states, as well 
as all U.S. territories, have requested extensions, which are under review.329 Five states 
are under review for extension requests. See Appendix C for the compliance status for 
each state. Currently, states are not subject to federal compliance reviews and 
enforcement of the REAL ID Act. 
In compliance with the REAL ID Act of 2005 (the Act), the REAL ID applicant 
must show photo identity with the person’s full legal name and date of birth, or 
documentation showing the person’s date of birth, or proof of the person’s social security 
number, or documentation showing the person’s full name and residential address. The 
applicant must also show evidence of lawful status, whether citizen or non-citizen: alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent or temporary residence, conditional permanent resident, 
approved application for asylum or entered as a refugee, pending asylum application, 
valid non-immigrant visa, or a pending or approved application for temporary protected 
status in the United States.330  
For card production, the REAL ID Act stipulates a number of verifiable 
identifiers be listed on the card, including the individual’s full legal name, date of birth, 
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card identification number, a digital photograph of the individual, applicant’s signature, 
and residential address.331 The card would have common machine-readable technology 
(MRT) and other features to prevent tampering and counterfeiting and would expire in 
eight years.332 Cards that do not meet the stated requirements must have a “unique design 
or color.”333 They must plainly state “on [the] face [of the card] that it may not be 
accepted by any Federal agency for federal identification or any other official 
purpose.”334 
North Dakota addressed the issue requiring additional designators for status on its 
REAL ID compliant cards as it relies heavily on the REAL ID card for voter verification. 
North Dakota state law requires a citizenship status designator be added to each driver’s 
license to help their officials to distinguish status for use in voter verification. This 
requirement is set in their North Dakota Century Code Chapter 39-06 regarding 
operator’s licenses where they specify non-citizen cards “must be designed in a manner 
to clearly make the card distinguishable from a similar card issued to a citizen of the 
United States and resident of this state.”335 This requisite is in place for both driver’s 
licenses and non-driver’s licenses.  
North Dakota also addresses the problem individuals might face for replacing a 
card as their status changes, such as when lawful permanent residents become naturalized 
citizens. State officials placed this language into their code, “The card may be replaced 
with a card issued to a citizen of this country and resident of this state only when proof of 
U.S. citizenship is provided by the individual and any applicable replacement fee listed in 
section 39-06-49 is paid.”336 States could adopt similar language recommending the card 
be replaced should the individual become a citizen.  
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Although the REAL ID Act clearly articulates that the Act does not relate to 
voting or registering to vote, it appears permissible for states to legislate law to use such 
identification for voter verification. If status is not distinguished on the card for ease of 
use by an election official, another option might be for each polling site to have access to 
the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) database at the polling sites to verify card 
information and citizenship status, although the inefficiency of this method could cause 
long lines and delays on Election Day. 
F. MAIL-IN REGISTRATION AND VOTING 
For over 150 years, voting by mail for absentee voting has been permitted for the 
military, those who were immobile due to health, and those away from their normal 
jurisdiction due to education or employment.337 In 1995, Oregon became the first state to 
conduct its voting exclusively through mail.338 Washington State moved to an entirely 
vote-by-mail system in 2011.339 In 2013, Colorado began relying on a vote-by-mail 
system, although it does offer some polling sites.340 Twenty-two states have provisions in 
their state law to conduct some elections entirely by mail.341 These states verify by 
matching the signature on the ballot or envelope to those within the registration list.342  
In studying the vote-by-mail systems, several points of vulnerability can be found. 
Signatures cannot be electronically measured the same way as facial photos and 
fingerprints. “It is very possible to train oneself to fraudulently replicate someone else’s 
signature, and even simpler to alter your own signature while attempting double 
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registration.”343 Ballots may not get to their intended voter, or may be returned after the 
deadline.344 Heavy or total mail-in voting can cause a large number of votes being 
uncounted until after Election Day.345 In addition, visual verification by humans for each 
signature against the electronic capture of the registration signature on millions of votes 
would be inefficient and costly.  
Despite these drawbacks, mail-in registration and voting appears overwhelmingly 
convenient and popular. In the 2012 election, 30 states permitted voters to request vote-
by-mail without having to provide an excuse as required by normal absentee voting. 
Identity verification and dependability of mail delivery remain concerns, however.346 
States handle these concerns in different ways. During voter registration, 
Colorado verifies the individual’s eligibility based upon address, age, and affirmation of 
citizenship. The state also requires the voter applicants to provide their driver’s license 
number or their last four digits of their social security numbers. These identifiers are used 
to match this information against the database of the division of motor vehicles, which is 
REAL ID compliant that can ascertain whether citizenship was verified.347 Washington 
State and Oregon require individuals to register before voting as well; however, these 
states are not REAL ID compliant, and therefore, proof of citizenship, in particular, is not 
verified.348 Washington State and Oregon do utilize ERIC and a number of other 
databases to assist with keeping their voter registration updated, yet verification of 
citizenship appears to elude them.349 
                                                 
343 Ole Holtved, Biometrics in Elections, Georgia: De-Duplication or Voter Register and Verification 
of Voter Identity Using Biometics (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency International Development, 2011), 6, 
http://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/biometrics_in_elections_2011_0.pdf. 
344 CALTECH/MIT, The Voting Technology Project: Looking Back, Looking Ahead (Pasadena, CA 
and Cambridge, MA: The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, 2016), 8, http://www.vote.caltech.edu/ 
reports/8. 
345 CALTECH/MIT, 9. 
346 Mann, “Mail Ballots in the United States: Policy Choice and Administrative Challenges,” 114. 
347 Colorado Secretary of State, Election Law, Colorado’s Revised Statutes, Title 1 (Denver: State of 
Colorado, 2017), 62, https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/LawsRules/files/Title1.pdf. 
348 Department of Homeland Security, “REAL ID.” 
349 “Washington State Voter Registration Database,” Washington State Secretary of State, accessed 
November 12, 2017, https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/vrdb/; “Electronic Registration Information Center: 
Who We Are,” ERIC, accessed January 15, 2018, http://www.ericstates.org/whoweare. 
 85
In his 2014 published paper, “Voter Confidence as a Metric of Election 
Performance,” Paul Gronke shared that voter confidence ratings were lower for vote-by-
mail voters as compared to early in-person or polling place voters.350 He provides hope 
that officials can nurture confidence among the constituency by ensuring voters have 
positive voting experiences.  
G. VOTER REGISTRATION: KEEPING THE LISTS CLEAN 
Voter registration is costly and complicated.351 Biographic data are highly 
changeable and without common data formats, high levels of inconsistencies and 
unreliable data across systems can exist. Verifying eligibility can be impossible when the 
state and local election officials do not have the tools they need. Voter registration is also 
one of the most important aspects of elections to ensure integrity in the program. If done 
well, it substantiates election legitimacy and ensures the will of the citizens.  
Spurred by the Gore v. Bush election fiasco, the voter technology project 
researched the 2000 election and estimated 1.5 to 3 million votes were lost due to poor 
registration methods.352 Election experts believe registration can suppress legitimate 
voters while opening a vulnerability for voter fraud.353  
1. The Rules and Methods 
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requires states to maintain their 
voter registration lists.354 A credible voter registration lists give legitimacy to the 
electoral process and prevents election fraud.355 Forty-nine states and the District of 
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Columbia are required by federal law (HAVA) to create and maintain an electronic 
central voter file.356 The requirement for maintaining a list under HAVA has one 
exception, that of North Dakota.357 North Dakota abolished its voter registration in 1951 
due to the rural nature of the state and close networks of the communities within.358 As 
the North Dakota legislation occurred prior to HAVA, North Dakota is considered 
exempt. The state does allow its cities to register voters for city elections.359 The state 
requires, however, voters to present identification at the time of voting. This 
identification requires a North Dakota driver’s license, non-driver identification, or tribal 
identification with the current residential address and date of birth.360  
For the other states, HAVA allows by-mail voter registration and creates 
requirements for how states should maintain their voter lists for federal elections. For 
instance, HAVA requires the states to keep the voter information current and requires 
states to embed safeguards that prevent an eligible voter from being unintentionally 
removed.361  
States have gone on to allow registration in multiple ways: in person at an election 
office, other public sites facilitating registration, or through registration drives by 
community or political organizations.362 Some states offer online voter registration, same 
day registration through provisional voting, and pre-registration opportunities for 
teens.363  
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Several states allow for automatic or streamlined voter registration through their 
DMV. Registering to vote at a DMV was originally made possible through the 1993 
National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). This act mandates that each state driver’s 
license form include voter registration information.364 In Oregon, voters are 
automatically registered from the Oregonian DMV database.365 The same is for 
California. Individuals may choose to opt-out if they do not wish to be on a registration 
list and vote.366 
Voter applicants may also send in a completed national mail voter registration 
(NMVR) form by mail, maintained by the EAC. All states use this form except North 
Dakota and Wyoming.367 New Hampshire uses the form only as a request for an absentee 
voter form.368 On the NMVR form, the voter applicants must indicate their status as 
either U.S. citizen or non-citizen.369 Due to their specific laws, states may or may not ask 
voters to verify citizenship later. See Figure 4 for states’ voter registration methods. 
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Figure 4.  The Election Administration and Voting Survey: 2016 Voter 
Registration Methods.370 
Registration problems can cause lost votes. According to a survey held by the 
CalTech/MIT voting technology project, the 2008 general election lost 2.2 million votes 
due to registration problems.371 In February 2012, the PEW Charitable Trusts published 
research that found “one in eight state voter registrations is inaccurate, more than 1.8 
million deceased voters are still on the rolls and approximately 2.75 million voters are 
registered in more than one state.”372 During this same research period, it was estimated 
“at least 51 million eligible U.S. citizens were unregistered, or more than 24 percent of 
the eligible population.”373 Voter registration issues are costly and affect the outcome of 
an election.  
Election experts Stephen Ansolabehere and Eitan Hersh suggest four purposes for 
registration lists: to link voters to precincts, to authenticate voters at the polls, to audit 
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election results, and to prevent in-person voter fraud.374 The findings of this thesis 
suggest a fifth important function for voter registration listings: to verify voter identity 
and eligibility at the time of registration and throughout the lifetime of the voter.  
2. Two Multi-State Systems: ERIC and Crosscheck 
Two multi-state systems have grown out of a state response to increase data 
integrity in the voter registration rosters. Former Kansas Secretary of State Ron 
Thornburgh signed a four-state agreement in December 2005 for what has become the 
interstate voter registration crosscheck program or known simply as Crosscheck. As of 
2017, 30 states are participating in Crosscheck. The other well-known voter verification 
system was initiated by the Pew Charitable Trusts in 2012, ERIC.375 It is owned, 
managed, and funded by 21 member states.376  
These systems can detect issues for the states. In 2016, Crosscheck had detected 
over five million potential matches between states based upon first name, last name, data 
of birth, and last four of the social security numbers.377 Each potential match is reported 
to the specific states so verification can take place at the local or state levels. ERIC found 
large numbers of potential duplicates as well. Between 2013 and 2017, ERIC identified 
722,443 cross-state movers, 5,527,933 in-state movers, 141,203 in-state duplicate 
registrations, and 199,594 deceased voters identified for removal from 16 states plus the 
District of Columbia voter registration lists.378 Although the two multi-state systems are 
utilized by several states for verification enhancements, the challenges remain enormous.  
While most private industry and many government agencies have updated 
their systems to take advantage of modern technology, voter registration 
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systems remain largely based on 19th century tools, such as handwriting 
on paper forms and postal mail. The inherent inefficiencies in the system 
result in unnecessarily high costs, and make it difficult to keep voter rolls 
clean throughout the country. For example, 1 in 8 voter registration 
records in America contain a serious error. In addition, more than 51 
million citizens, or 25 percent, remain unregistered to vote. (ERIC)379  
Disparate formats and systems can cause havoc when verifying data against other 
systems. Formatting standards may be incompatible with the two main multi-state 
systems, ERIC and Crosscheck, let alone federal databases, such as the USCIS SAVE 
program, Social Security Death Index, and the U.S. Postal Service NCOALink for 
address verification. When systems are mismatched and dissimilar, connectivity may be 
difficult or impossible. As election expert Charles Stewart III states, “The geographic 
churn in the American adult population creates a record-keeping challenge for the system 
of voter registration in the United States.”380 Add to these formidable challenges the 
number of individuals who become eligible to vote (those who turn 18 or become 
naturalized citizens), those who become ineligible to vote (those that become a convicted 
felon, those determined incompetent, and the few who are denaturalized), as well as the 
massive numbers of voters who simply move to another jurisdiction. Maintaining state 
listings can be a record-keeping nightmare. 
People register multiple times in one or more states for many legitimate reasons. 
The United States has a highly mobile population. Those affected by economic 
downturns or natural disasters may be more transient than others.381 Updating a voter 
registry is not likely high on a person’s to-do list when moving. Any registration system 
should be built in a manner that is convenient for voters to update their information, 
while allowing for other systems to help update that information, such as when a new 
driver’s license is gained due to a move or the U.S. Postal Service receives a change of 
address card. When records are not updated, however, it may allow for voting across state 
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lines or county jurisdictions. Not all states use ERIC and Crosscheck, and each has 
information gaps, such as citizenship verifications.  
3. The Virginia Example 
Virginia is a good state to profile for one that is assertively maintaining its voter 
lists. It was one of the first states to create a singular state voter registration database and 
has been a leader in voter registration list maintenance practices and reporting.382 The 
state election board participates in both ERIC and Crosscheck. As voter information is 
added, updated, or classified as in-active, it can require thousands of database 
transactions per month. Virginia invests in sending confirmation mailings to the voter’s 
last known address to ensure the integrity of the data gleaned from other systems. These 
mail outs include postage paid envelopes to ease the burden on the voter.383 If no 
response is received, the voter is classified as in-active. In Virginia, inactive voters who 
have not voted or updated their information for a period of two federal elections are 
removed.  
For removing convicted felons from their list pursuant to § 24.2-409 of the Code 
of Virginia, the state relies on gaining information from the Virginia State Police Central 
Criminal Record Exchange for monthly lists of felony convictions. As potential matches 
are made in their voter list, they are reviewed by their general registrar for confirmation 
and processing.384  
Per § 24.2-410 of the Code of Virginia, information is gained from circuit court 
clerks regarding individuals found to be legally mentally incapacitated.385 Any potential 
matches are reviewed by the general registrar for confirmation and processing. Similarly, 
per § 24.2-404.3 of the Code of Virginia, information is matched against the federal 
Social Security Death Index, and the Bureau of Vital Statistics at the Virginia Department 
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of Health to learn of matches to potentially deceased voters.386 These records are 
reviewed by the state’s registrar to substantiate a match. 
Virginia relies on its DMV to gain information on non-citizens per § 24.2-410.1 
of the Code of Virginia.387 The DMV asks driver’s license applicants if they are citizens. 
Virginia DMV officials send state election officials listings for non-citizens. The 
information is matched against the voter registration list. If matches are found, the 
general registrar reviews the information. The voter registration record will be removed 
unless the registered voters affirm their citizenship in writing.388  
Currently, citizenship may not be proven unless the voter provides verifiable 
documents or the election officials gain access to multi-state birth record system, such as 
EVVE or the SAVE program. Although ERIC and Crosscheck are powerful tools for 
detecting potential duplicates and discrepancies, they cannot verify citizenship.389 ERIC 
and Crosscheck do not appear to be linked to EVVE or USCIS SAVE. If linked with state 
vital statistics databases, it could combine the information to verify claimed birth in that 
state to enable the 21 states that use ERIC as a voter registration verification tool to 
conduct further eligibility tests. The same would hold true for Crosscheck, which has 30 
participating states.390 Ultimately, both proof of citizenship presented at the time of 
registration and election official verification through EVVE and SAVE should be 
performed to close the gap between law and procedure.  
4. A Pew Center Study on Voter Registration Lists  
A national database was created to study registration lists accuracies. The Pew 
Center on the States hired a nonprofit organization called RTI International to purchase 
the voter registration lists from each state and perform a comprehensive study on the 
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quality and accuracy of the lists.391 The results of this study entitled Inaccurate, Costly, 
and Inefficient: Evidence That America’s Voter Registration System Needs an Upgrade 
was published in February 2012. RTI International utilized a database called Catalist, 
LLC, to import and process the gained voter information.392 This database is not used as 
a national registry, but instead is a research tool.  
The 2012 comprehensive report published after compilation and analysis found 
that an estimated 24 million inaccuracies in the voter registration listings; 12 million 
records contained an inaccurate address.393 Over 2.7 million voters were registered in 
more than one state. The NCSL echoes the concerns of the Pew Center study in its article, 
“The Cost of Inaccuracy: Voter Registration Examined.”394 Although it is possible for 
states to check their registries with information coming from national databases, such as 
the U.S. Postal Service, and some states check their data against that of their neighbors, 
list accuracy is a difficult target. Inaccuracies are costly.395  
Accurately maintaining voter registration listings ensure electoral integrity and 
confidence in elections by voters.396 To have accurate listings, proactively cross-
referencing with state and federal systems is instrumental. Even in states with the most 
robust practices for maintaining their lists, some voter information will not be correct 
come Election Day. Voters will move and change their names due to life events. Having 
the ability for voters to register or update information on Election Day and cast a 
provisional vote aids in protecting the right to vote. Verification would be needed before 
the vote is counted. Robust capabilities are needed to verify information efficiently. 
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VI. TWO INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Democracy Rebooted, written by Conny B. McCormack of the Atlantic Council, 
lays out just what is at stake with weak elections and a society afraid of moving forward 
into a technological world.397 “At a moment of profound political divisions and growing 
distrust between citizens and their governments, transparency, accuracy, and credibility 
are more important than ever.”398  
This chapter fully addresses research question two: Would the use of a national 
voter registration database with a biometric program better balance identify and 
eligibility verification to ensure all eligible voters vote and that those who are ineligible 
do not? These two solutions are working well in other nations. The United States has the 
innovative expertise to create tools used with success by other nations to enhance 
integrity, protect privacy, promote transparency, increase confidence, and strengthen one 
of the most critical aspects of democracy: free and fair elections.  
A. USING A NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION LIST 
Although state election board officials have come a long way in the creation and 
maintenance of the lists since HAVA was enacted, state officials still have significant 
challenges with maintaining their lists.399 According to The Voting Technology Project: 
Looking Back, Looking Ahead, “voter registration was an important point of failure for 
many potential voters, and [The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project] called for 
efforts to clean up and modernize voter registration databases as well as to implement 
procedures like provisional balloting as fail-safes for potential voters for whom the 
registration process might have lost.”400 For election integrity, a solid practice during 
registration, continuous voter registration list maintenance, and voter identity and 
eligibility verification needs to be in place. Through the NRVA, states must maintain a 
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voter registration list; however they may not be equipped to manage data for a highly 
mobile and complex population.  
1. The Canadian National Register Model 
Canada, another federally based country, has very high election confidence based 
on studies by the internationally recognized EIP, a Harvard University and University of 
Sydney collaboration. In 2016, EIP ranked Canada at 75 points out of a 100-point index. 
Out of the 158 counties studied, Canada ranked 17th overall.401 The United States ranked 
at 52 points.402 Canada also has very high turn-out rates for elections. One distinct factor 
that may play heavily into Canada’s success with elections is it has a national voter 
registration list.403 
Canadian voters do not have the burden of maintaining their voter registration; 
voter registration is practically automatic.404 “There is no need for voters to interact with 
election officials directly.”405 Information within the registration list is constantly 
verified with other federal and provincial systems. This more practical approach can 
prevent the possibility of voter fraud crime in advance by a verification method that is 
secure, prevents voter disenfranchisement, and enhances integrity. Canada requires 
identification at the time of voting, but is generous in the types of identification allowed. 
If the voters do not have a current address on their identification, they are required to 
provide an affirmation prior to being allowed to vote.406  
In 1997, the Canadian Parliament created the National Register, which is based 
partially on the provincial rolls and to some extent on other government lists to prevent 
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fraudulent voting and increase participation.407 The National Register database contains 
the voter’s identifiers: name, address, gender, and date of birth.408 It also creates a unique 
identifier for each voter to help track changes to the voter’s record. If voters are 
uncomfortable about their personal data being in a centralized voter database, they have 
the right to opt out while yet retaining their right to vote by submitting a provisional-type 
vote at the time of election, which is then verified by election officials. Eligible voters 
realize many benefits when included in the National Register, such as not having to re-
register during life changes, such as relocating. Voters are sent notification cards near the 
time of election that equips them with information on when and where to vote.409  
This federal voter list has helped to increase trust in Canadian elections, reduce 
administrative costs, and improve accuracy in the voter registration lists.410 Canada 
credibly estimates it has saved more than $30 million Canadian dollars (approximately 
$22.5 million U.S. dollars) for each four-year election cycle since 2000.411 Canada 
recouped its startup costs associated with purchasing, installing, and utilizing the new 
national registration list during the first election cycle it used it.412  
Canada’s transition costs were relatively low. Canada built its current 
registration system over the course of several years, phasing in data-
sharing arrangements between election authorities and other government 
agencies. The start-up costs for developing each arrangement varied by 
agency. For instance, Canada spent $116,000 Canadian dollars over the 
1997–1999 tax years developing protocols for acquiring information from 
federal citizenship and immigration authorities. The most expensive data-
sharing arrangement to develop was with the federal tax agency, which 
cost $3 million Canadian dollars.  Canada spent $19.2 million Canadian 
dollars developing its data-sharing procedures, most of which was spent 
on computer hardware and software.413 
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If these Canadian figures are extrapolated with no variables other than the size of 
the population, the United States could potentially save an estimated $200 million U.S. 
dollars during each general election cycle if it adopts a national voter registration system. 
A Pew Study found that Canada, using technology, spends less than 35 cents per voter for 
registration maintenance. Ninety-three percent of its population is registered to vote.414 
As a cost comparison, Oregon spent $4.11 per active voter ($7.67 per transaction) on its 
mail-in voting program in 2012.415  
Canadian election officials use information gained by over 40 different 
government agencies (both provisional and federal level) to add eligible citizens to the 
National Register.416 This process is done through consent language on other agency 
forms, including forms submitted via the internet. Without requiring any effort on the 
part of the voter, election officials are able to update addresses in the National Register to 
keep the roster current. Canadian agencies that share information include the following: 
 Canada Revenue Agency 
 Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 
 National Defence 
 Provincial and territorial driver’s license agencies 
 Provincial and territorial vital statistics agencies 
 Provincial and territorial electoral agencies with permanent voter lists 
 Postal agencies  
 Voters’ lists from recent elections in other Canadian jurisdictions417  
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If the information shared is doubted at all, election official send individuals pre-
printed forms with postage-paid envelopes to verify information. Officials can cross-
check information against multiple systems, build the voter rolls, continually keep 
addresses and name changes updated, and detect potential ineligible voters. Deceased 
voter records are automatically purged based on information provided by vital statistic 
agencies.418 Corrections may also be made on Election Day (elections are spread over 
multiple days in Canada) to capture and verify information before the vote is counted.419 
Canadian voters can also go online at any time to check the status of their information in 
the National Register. As Canadian voters move from one location to another within 
Canada, they will update motor vehicle information and postal information. On paper or 
electronic forms, individuals have the opportunity to check a consent box to have these 
agencies share the update with other agencies, such as for the National Register for 
voters. In this manner, the voter does not have the burden of updating voter information. 
“Election officials can update the voter rolls continuously, using information that already 
exists on other government lists.”420 This opportunity saves money, increases 
efficiencies, and bolsters accuracy of the registration database.  
Canada proactively seeks to prevent fraudulent voting while mitigating 
disenfranchisement. It adds eligible voters to the rosters using “carefully regulated data-
sharing between government agencies.”421 If discrepancies are found, the voters are 
contacted for verification, to include any questions of opting in for being placed on voter 
rolls, which keeps their voter registration lists clean and accurate.  
This approach is growing. “Moreover, the number of countries relying on data-
sharing to keep their voter rolls current is increasing, as governments re-evaluate and 
overhaul their approach to voter registration.”422 Australia and Great Britain have started 
down a similar path to save costs and ensure accuracy in the voter rolls. In 1999, 
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Australia sent a delegation to Canada to study how data-sharing could enhance the 
integrity of the Australian election system.423  
2. Considerations for a National Voter Registration List in the United 
States 
The United States needs to ensure inclusiveness, convenience, and accuracy in 
voter registration lists. As Canada is geographically close to the United States, as well as 
culturally and economically related, its election strategies may be easily adopted by the 
United States. Canada has been able to achieve a comprehensive voter registration 
database in a relatively direct manner and made it successful in a few short years. It 
estimates to have gained back its investment after the first national election in the early 
2000s.  
The U.S. population is much larger than Canada’s; building a database and 
ensuring accuracy will take time. The stakeholders (states, voters, advocacy groups) need 
to understand the advantages and commit to a long-term plan for implementation. The 
rewards will benefit the United States for years to come and will ultimately strengthen the 
integrity of the U.S. election system. If the United States were to adopt such a voter 
registration system, it would move from diversified, hard to manage systems to a unified 
system that leverages other systems to keep it maintained. Only 68 percent of U.S. 
citizens are estimated to be registered.424 Conversely, Canada enjoys a 93 percent 
enrollment rate for eligible voters.425 
As in Canada, the states should remain vitally involved with the collection and 
maintenance of the voter information, according to the law of the land. By data-sharing 
with multiple state and federal systems, the voter information could be maintained in an 
efficient and cost-savings manner. The existence of a national system would require 
federal legislation, however, as well as careful and continual cooperation of federal and 
state officials.  
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To determine whether a national database is achievable in the United States, a 
review of the 10th Amendment is helpful. “The collection of information on vital events 
is a power delegated to the individual States. The Constitution of the United States of 
America provides that powers not specifically delegated to the Federal government nor 
denied to the States, are reserved to the States (Article X, Amendments).”426 Each state 
has civil laws that provide for a state civil registry system. Civil registries, like elections, 
are the responsibility of the states. The federal government can and has enacted 
legislation to authorize federal agencies to create and maintain national-level databases 
holding confidential information on residents of the United States. This information 
includes the Social Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, Department of 
State, and the U.S. Postal Service to name a few. These national databases have specific 
purposes for enhancing and sustaining interconnected state and federal programs. A 
similar framework could be established to create a singular national voter registration list.  
To detect issues with the voter registration listings, election officials must be able 
to spot discrepancies. Catching discrepancies can be problematic in the United States 
where registration systems are so disparate and election officials do not have access to 
citizenship and vital records systems. For example, an election official in Missouri may 
not be able to verify if a registered Missouri voter was born in another U.S. state, as 
claimed. That same election official is not likely able to verify the naturalization of a 
foreign-born resident, either. Documents can be provided, but these may be fraudulent 
documents.  
Creating a national voter registration list should be transparent to the voters, but it 
will be a striking difference for state officials and the federal agency or commission 
chosen to manage it. A basic structure could be similar to how Canada built its system, or 
perhaps modeled after ERIC, Crosscheck, or Catalist.  
If a national voter registration list was compiled from each state and the District 
of Columbia, duplicative information could matched and reviewed. Upon confirmation of 
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duplication, the records could be merged or removed. The database could be 
crosschecked against numerous state and federal databases to make the list accurate and 
clean. Unlike the present methods for reaching out to each state’s vital records official, 
birth and naturalization records could be more readily verified by election officials.427 A 
centralized list would reduce the maintenance cost and the burden to state and local 
election officials. It would increase the accuracy of the collective voter registration list, 
and would ensure uniformity across the nation in conducting proper list maintenance.  
“Fair elections are a public good.”428 The United States can learn from Canada, as 
well as other nations, and shore up voter identity and eligibility verification and increase 
confidence in elections. The Canadians have already demonstrated the effectiveness of 
these practices. It can happen in spite of the large population difference between Canada 
and the United States. Canada has a population 11 percent the size of the U.S. 
population.429 The same framework could still be applied, however. India manages to 
maintain a national registry for its 1.31 billion population of both citizens and non-
citizens. Individuals are tied to their information via biometrics to keep information 
secure.430 
Maintaining a voter registration list can run into the millions of dollars for state 
and local budgets between expenses of detecting inaccuracies, printing notification cards 
and mailing them, as well as processing mail and receiving undeliverable mail.431 These 
challenges further support the notion that a robust, secure, and interoperable national 
voter registration list would be a cost-savings and add value to the states and to the 
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nation. The consolidation of the registries, while leveraging from local, state, and federal 
databases to keep the list clean can save money and enhance trust in U.S. elections.  
B. A BIOMETRIC SOLUTION FOR IDENTITY VERIFICATION 
At a time of low confidence in American elections, it is time to seek creative ways 
to shore up vulnerabilities and regain public trust. According to the National Conference 
of State Legislatures, at least half of the states are considering new technologies for 
ensuring free and fair elections due to election worries.432 Using biometric technologies 
for increasing election integrity should be considered, as it is working well for other 
nations. 
An inaccurate voter register can cause problems in the electoral process by 
raising doubts about the elections inclusiveness and outcome and by 
opening up avenues for fraud and manipulation. Many countries that face 
challenges in creating an accurate voter register are considering reforming 
their voter registration systems through the introduction of biometric 
technologies. Such reforms are aimed at increasing trust in the electoral 
process by enfranchising all eligible citizens and, at the same time, 
reducing various forms of electoral fraud, such as impersonation and 
multiple voting.433  
Biometric screening has become increasingly critical in safeguarding the 
homeland and protecting programs. Biometrics, along with a national voter registration 
list, appears able to prevent the possibility of voter fraud crime in advance by a 
verification method that has shown to be highly secure, would prevent voter 
disenfranchisement by reducing the requirement for voter identification needed at the 
polling sites, and would enhance free and fair elections.  
By using fingerprint technology, voters would no longer need an official 
identification card; they would simply press their fingers against a scanner to have their 
identity verified.434 With a highly mobile population, biometrics together with a national 
voter registration list will accommodate the relocation of voters and proper identification 
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of an individual wherever they reside in the United States. Using biometrics could 
increase participation, add convenience, protect integrity, and bolster the accuracy of 
voter registration lists. Additionally, biometrics could pave the way for eventual online 
voting, including military personnel stationed abroad, and replace mail-in voting as a 
convenient voting option. The program may be able to embed a voting verification 
method that does not alienate minorities or poor, while ensuring verification processes 
are in place to protect against voter fraud.435  
Exceptions will be required. Some individuals are not capable of providing 
fingerprints due to missing limbs or appendages. Waivers should be made for those 
whose prints are hard to take due to age, sickness, or other reasons where fingerprints are 
hard to gain. States adopting biometrics will also likely allow exceptions to the 
requirement, such as for religious objections to being photographed, for those having no 
identification documents due to a recent natural disaster, or for those with confidential 
listings due to being victims of domestic abuse or stalking.436 When these exceptions 
occur, policy should allow for several alternatives, to include other biographical or 
biometrics (such as photos with signatures) that would ensure the strongest capture of 
identifiers for the individual. 
Despite the need for some exceptions, biometrics has long been utilized to 
enhance U.S. security by identifying individuals at ports of entry and across screening 
programs.437 Increased use of biometrics on college campuses, for banking transactions, 
phone and laptop access, driver’s licenses and public benefits are paving the way to 
consumer acceptance. Many states currently use AFIS for employee credentialing and 
law enforcement purposes. The main purpose in the use of civil fingerprint identification 
systems is security, verification, and preventing multiple enrollments.438  
                                                 
435 Barry and Newman, “Could Fingerprinting Finish the Debate Over Voter ID Laws?”  
436 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Voter Identification Requirements.” 
437 Department of Homeland Security, “Office of Biometric Identity Management Identification 
Services.”  
438 King, “Law Enforcement and Biometrics.”  
 105
In most states, voter verification is currently confirmed through the visual 
inspection of common identification, for example, a driver’s license. Instead of using a 
document you have (which are high-risk for fraud), or something you know (such as a 
password, which can be forgotten or stolen), a biometric verification program would 
allow individuals to use their unique physical feature, such as their fingerprints, face, or 
iris to verify who they are.439 Biometrics appears to be the next logical step in moving 
forward for accurate identity management in a secure, convenient, interoperable, and 
standardized way. As verifying identities is becoming increasingly more important in 
both the government and private sectors, this scalable capability can be adopted and 
implemented in a concerted way to meet identity verification needs. Biometrics can 
resolve the susceptibilities encountered when documents are hard to verify and those that 
are vulnerable to fraud. 
Fingerprints, in particular, are used to reliably authenticate a person’s claimed 
identity.440 The ridges of skin on the fingers form exclusive markers.441 When printed 
and scanned, they can be tied to the same individual, despite spelling variations, the use 
of multiple names or dates of birth, as well as movement from one residence to another.  
No two prints are identical [unless taken from the same individual]. Twins 
do not have identical prints. The left and right hand prints of a person are 
not identical. You can’t tell a person’s age, gender, or ethnicity from their 
fingerprints.442 
Biometrics, coupled with corresponding biographic information, would allow 
merging and cleanup of multiple voter records created by those who moved often, who 
had legal name changes, or by those attempting fraud. According to the IDEA, 
“Biometric technology can significantly decrease opportunities for voting at multiple 
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sites in the same election.”443 It is a powerful anti-fraud tool and a great means for quick 
identity verification.  
Fingerprint verification would be matching newly scanned prints against prints 
previously scanned at the time of registration. Specific fingerprint features would be 
compared, known as minutiae that consist of points and ridge lines.444 Highly complex 
algorithms are used to exam and compare fingerprint features within a biometric 
repository.445 The entire pattern does not have to be found in the repository to gain a 
match; but rather, a sufficient number of minutiae patterns have to be identical to gain a 
solid match.446 This process allows for tilting or skews of the fingers when the print was 
gained. Biometric reading systems can measure anywhere from 30 to 400 markers, and 
create an accordingly complex and unique key, called a fingerprint identification number 
(FIN).447  
Over 45 nations have added biometrics to their voter registration requirements as 
a method for identifying voters, including Africa and Latin America. Some countries 
have been using biometrics in elections for over a decade.448 Bangladesh, after 
overcoming initial legislative challenges, successfully implemented a biometrics program 
for its elections that included registering over 80.5 million voters in just 11 months.449 
Fiji, Mongolia, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia and India, among other nations, are all 
successfully utilizing biometrics in elections. The Philippines is using biometrics to 
verify the identities of voters and prevent multiple registrations.450 Participation is 
mandatory and those wanting to have their vote counted must have registered their 
biometrics in their national system.  
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Some of these nations issue barcoded cards after biometric information is 
captured, as card readers may be cheaper than fingerprint scanners. Some nations capture 
biometrics in the registration process, then use fingerprint scanners at the time of 
elections. A significant technological difference exists between these two methods in 
efficiencies, effectiveness, and cost. Of course, implementation challenges are likely 
affected by the quality of the machines purchased, rollout methods, and training.451  
Thousands of U.S. entities, both government and civilian, use biometrics for 
verification. Health, welfare, policing, courts, and banking institutions are starting to use 
biometrics to know who is who. Theme parks and universities are starting to use 
biometrics as well for security and safety reasons. These sectors use biometrics to secure 
data, prevent fraud, reduce expenses, and provide convenience to the employee or 
customer. Biometrics is being integrated into the daily life for many Americans. These 
industries could provide valuable lessons learned for adoption purposes including how to 
legally frame the programs. The United States can learn what opportunities might be 
worth further exploring and what lessons were learned.  
While biometrics can go a long way in identity verification, by confirming 
identity; biometrics cannot confirm eligibility. It really must be a two-part solution. 
Nonetheless, based upon the known usages by thousands of governments and commercial 
entities, biometrics could possibly pave the way for singular thumbprint verification at 
the polls and eventual online voting. 
Weaving a biometric program into elections will be a tremendous undertaking and 
will greatly impact all voters, election and government officials, and volunteer workers. 
Any new implementation may have both anticipated and unanticipated effects.452 In 
particular, adding biometrics will adjust the way registrations and voter verifications 
occur.453  
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A phased rollout or pilot programs should be used to change to the new 
procedures slowly. Officials should ensure that registration is accessible to all citizens, to 
include the disabled and impoverished. Sites should be set up at many accessible 
community centers, schools, hospitals, retirement homes, and colleges. The numbers of 
voters showing up to register should be anticipated so plenty of equipment and personnel 
are available to accommodate the registration process.  
Careful communication and education is critical to such a major change in the 
process, with all stakeholders. A voter outreach plan needs to be in place, as well as the 
development of standard operating procedures. Clear messaging on the benefits and how 
the state plans to mitigate challenges and address concerns should be offered in advance 
of any changes. Voters need to understand the changes, as well as a phased rollout of new 
procedures. Good public education by both the state and federal entities that support 
elections will be extremely valuable. Requirements should be clearly and widely 
communicated, such as bringing identification for registration or to the polling sites, to 
prevent delays and disenfranchisement. Biometric identity management must be 
combined with clean voter registration listings based upon confirmation of voter 
eligibility through databases that can confirm residency, age, and citizenship.  
Election workers and volunteers will need training and guidance to ensure a 
smooth implementation. Preparation is needed at the registration and polling sites for 
equipment issues, questions, and additional planning for polling site registration and 
increased provisional votes may be necessary. Election officials need to be prepared for 
contingencies should issues arise. If a voter cannot be found through biometrics or 
through a registration list on Election Day, a biometric registration with provisional 
voting must be accommodated. A good resolution program should be in place to review 
records and resolve challenges for eligibility or poor biometrics capture, both at a local 
and state level. 
As biometric registration is introduced, the public may be swayed by perceptions. 
Clear communication is needed, as well as transparency for how the information is used 
and protected. The state and local election officials and the EAC can engage the public 
through a diverse use of dedicated online websites, information on each state and federal 
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election websites, brochures, digital toolkits to embassies, consulates, and military 
installations, posters, banners, videos, infographics, fact sheets, and possibly wallet cards 
can be effective outreach materials.454 People may avoid registration due to 
inconvenience. Officials should address religious beliefs and any anticipated cultural 
objections in advance of registration through robust and refined public information 
campaigns. Capturing the biometric data and reviewing documents takes time. 
Stakeholders should understand a plan accordingly.  
Concerns about data security will likely be raised. Ensuring good security 
protections are in place is vital to protect the additional confidential information captured 
for the voter registration lists. This protection needs to be transparent and messaged, as 
well as exactly how voter information will be used and will not be used. The database 
should be protected both legally and technically.455 Fortunately, many examples of 
proper data security are readily available, and managers can rely on guidance from the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), an international leader in 
technology security and practice.456 
The use of biometrics for de-duplicating a voter registration list is common 
around the globe; most of these countries issue a biometric-based identification card to 
their voters to use on Election Day.457 It is uncommon for a nation to use biometrics for 
identify verification on Election Day.458 It is uncommon, but not untested. Both methods 
should be reviewed.  
During the 2012 elections in Ghana, the biometric voter card-reading machines 
widely failed. They ended up extending voting to a second day, as a result, and stopped 
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the use of the card readers.459 More recently, all issues had been remedied and Ghanaians 
enjoyed a transparent and incident-free general election in December 2016, which 
bolsters its ranking as one of the strongest democracies in Africa.460  
Although failure rates are found to be low in the use of biometrics for elections, 
technology, equipment, and humans can fail.461 In reality, users need to anticipate 
software and hardware issues.462 Risks need to be evaluated and redundancies put in 
place. Failures will definitely occur in capturing the biometrics, typographical errors 
made in the registration data entry, and false duplicates that must be worked through.  
The quality of the equipment, the planning and implementation investment, and 
the level of training will be critical to overcoming these issues. Capturing all 10 
fingerprints has been found to have lower failure rates than scanning a singular print.463 
Systems that capture both fingerprints and facial photographs are more accurate than 
those only capturing one biometric element.464 Photo recognition programs have a higher 
failure rate than fingerprint biometrics. Contingency procedures should be ready in case 
issues occur at any point in the election lifecycle to prevent disenfranchisement and a 
reduction in confidence. 
Biometrics have been successfully used for decades in many nations and 
industries for access control, policing and justice, border security, passports, citizenship 
and driver’s license registration, and elections. “The industry sectors citing the highest 
levels of adoption of data analytics solutions are revenue and social service (81 percent 
and 80 percent, respectively), followed by border agencies (74 percent) and public safety 
agencies (62 percent).”465 Biometrics provides identity assurance, greater anti-fraud and 
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security for programs, increased efficiency in vetting processes, and high long-term 
stability for an identity verification means.466 A responsible and secure adoption of a 
biometric identity management program within the election infrastructure could equip 
state and local election officials to verify voter eligibility accurately, which enhances the 
reliability of the system that enables citizens to select national leaders. As embedding 
biometrics within elections is a substantial and long-term investment, careful 
consideration must be made.467 
Biometrics provides tamper-resistant identity verification on Election Day. 
Officials can confirm identity. They can match identity with information confirming 
eligibility. As more biometrics are gained and verified, the quick biometric check at the 
polling station can actually speed the opportunity to vote. Once gained, the biometrics 
would not have to be updated, only the biographical information on addresses, which 
could be done by both voters, as well as confirmation through other systems, such as the 
U.S. Postal Service NCOALink.468 Biometric verification allows confidence that voters 
are who they say they are. Biometric verification could lead to a verifiable and secure 
means for online voting, as well, which makes it more convenient for voters and 
increases accessibility for all who are eligible. 
C. SOLUTION PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS 
Confidence is hard to measure, “Voters are the most confident when their 
candidate wins.”469 Does this viewpoint mean confidence in elections is subjective? 
Elections are by nature, highly partisan, contentious, and sensitive to perceptions.470 If 
the process is perceived as being weak or affected by fraud event, the results might not be 
accepted. At a minimum, perceptions can damage confidence when negative events 
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occur. It is unclear whether confidence can be accurately measured and tested, but post-
election surveys are a good start. Acceptance, easy registration, identity and citizenship 
verifiability, and few complaints of accessibility and time spent in line at the polling sites 
play into citizens having confidence in elections. Some obvious measurements of 
performance are increased voter confidence, easy registration, identity and citizenship 
verifiability, and few complaints of accessibility and time spent in line at the polling sites.  
State voter registration lists need to be maintained and audits made public. As 
states have been entrusted with the substantial responsibility for ensuring integrity of the 
process and unrestricted access to citizens, more transparency is needed.471  
With regards to full adoption, some people will always be opposed to voter 
registration lists, any type of voter identification requirements at the time of voting, as 
well as any biometric requirement considered for adoption. Although it is likely that no 
one solution will please everyone, a need exists to find reasonable solutions that balance 
the need for providing eligible voters an equal chance to cast a ballot, while protecting 
the election process from abuse.472  
Despite more use of biometric technology, some individuals will always be 
concerned about privacy, adoption challenges, and cost. A solid channel of 
communication is necessary between all levels of government and special interest groups 
to clear up any misconceptions and apprehensions. Program success comes from 
widespread use. For instance, if only half of the counties choose to participate within a 
state, the program would still have identity verification issues. The results from all 
counties participating within the state would ensure high-integrity results for the state. 
The public might eventually accept biometrics for the convenience, the integrity of 
identities, as well as elections. It is a practical move for ensuring the reliability and 
security of a critical system. 
As states are responsible for elections within their state, each state must decide 
whether to support a national voter registration list and consider adopting a biometric 
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identity management system as verification solutions. Adopting a national voter 
registration list or database could be built in a manner that Canada achieved. As ERIC 
and Crosscheck multi-state systems hold many records for many states, perhaps one of 
these could serve as the foundation for such an endeavor. Lessons can also be learned 
from the 2012 Pew Center on the States study where voter registration information for 
every state except North Dakota was pulled into the Catalist system to analyze.473  
To adopt new biometric technology, including biometric scanners, the state’s 
election board would be responsible for the lifecycle of registration with biometric 
inclusion, eligibility vetting and assessment, voter registration confirmation, revocation 
or violation issues, and information technology services related to the screening process. 
Identification of all logistical and technical requirements to facilitate an interoperable 
system is needed to ensure a transparent and responsible adoption. 
For the states that embrace this technology, they could phase in a secure method 
for gaining biometrics over a two- to three-year span, to ease acceptance. The state would 
need to consider whether to capture all 10 fingerprints or only one or two. As stated 
earlier, using 10 fingerprints for identity verification improves the accuracy of 
identification, verses gaining only thumbprints, for instance. Having the 10 prints also 
improves interoperability with other verification systems, including federal and state 
systems that can help verify citizenship. Additionally, the state would need to determine 
whether to capture photos at this time for facial recognition to aid election workers and 
officials.  
The actual time to gain the fingerprints electronically would take approximately 
10 seconds per person. Another few minutes, however, would be needed to take photos 
and record the information from a voter registration card: full name, date of birth, and 
affirmation of citizenship. If voters are already registered, their biometrics could be 
linked to the biographical voter records at the time of the biometrics capture. They would 
have the chance to update pre-existing information, such as change of address or polling 
station location. It is also recommended voters continue being allowed to vote in 
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elections to capture their biometrics on Election Day and a statement affirming their U.S. 
citizenship. Once fingerprint biometrics is captured, it is sustainable and can be used 
throughout the voter’s lifetime for verification unless the voter’s biometric finger(s) are 
injured in some fashion. If some type of injury happens, accommodations should be 
made, such as using facial recognition instead.  
The time it would take for verification needs to be considered. As hardware 
becomes more powerful and faster, time is less of an issue, but one that needs to be 
considered carefully when planning.474 Once verified, the voter could then proceed to the 
voting area. If the fingerprints did not match, the verification would be rejected and the 
voter would need to be considered for a provisional vote where the identity could be 
further reviewed. The state could decide to permit photo identification to be presented 
and checked against the voter registration list. If no record of the individual exists in the 
voter registration list by either biometrics or by using photo identification, then the state 
should offer voter registration to capture biometrics and biographic to allow for a 
provisional vote. Citizenship documentation should be provided at that time by the voter. 
The voters’ identity would not, could not, be tied to their actual vote in any way. 
The only exception would be for provisional voters who had not registered prior to 
Election Day. Currently, provisional voter applications capture biographic information on 
the same form as their actual vote. The provisional ballot serves as a registration card. 
Biometrics could be captured at the time the provisional vote is made. Said voters would 
need to affirm they are U.S. citizens to be allowed to vote. If they were later found not to 
be an eligible voter, they could be found in violation of voter laws. 
Should voters move within a state, they could simply provide the election 
commission an electronic or paper request that provides an updated address. The same 
could be done with a name change and provide the proof of an official change of name, 
such as through marriage, to the state election commission. Biometrics, once obtained, 
would not be needed again.  
                                                 
474 U.S. Agency International Development, “Biometrics in Elections,” 5. 
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Fingerprint biometrics has a number of advantages. Physical features are much 
harder to fake than identity cards. People cannot forget their fingers like they can a 
password, and it is not possible to misplace them like individuals can with an 
identification or access card.475 Although an initial cost is incurred for equipment and 
imbedding the new technologies, training, implementation, the cost may be less than 
court challenges and mistrust in the integrity of election results. De-duplication of the 
voter registration list to aid in maintenance is highly effective when using electronically 
gained fingerprint biometrics.476  
As effective as fingerprint biometrics is, scanners and equipment can fail. Fingers 
should be clean when fingerprint biometrics is captured, both at the point of registration 
and at the time for scanning on Election Day. Despite machinery and training challenges, 
biometric systems and fingerprint scanners are a secure, sustainable and effective means 
of identification.477 As part of its historical role, the EAC would be vital in providing 
assistance for assistance on all things relating to elections, including support for new 
legislation, standards for technology in compliance with ISO 9001 certification and 
NIST, best practices for collecting, storing, safeguarding data, implementation and 
adoption, as well as technology training.478  
  
                                                 
475 Harris, “How Fingerprint Scanners Work.” 
476 U.S. Agency International Development, “Biometrics in Elections,” 11. 
477 U.S. Agency International Development, 11. 
478 “Committee Approves Next Generation of Voting Systems Guidelines,” Election Assistance 
Commission, September 12, 2017, https://www.eac.gov/news/2017/09/12/committee-approves-next-
generation-of-voting-system-guidelines/. 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
General elections have vastly improved since the contentious 2000 elections. New 
laws, such as HAVA, better equipment, more accountability, and the creation of the 
EAC, which promotes continuous election improvement, have greatly enhanced election 
administration and integrity. Through HAVA, over two billion U.S. dollars was 
appropriated to replace outdated equipment and support process improvement.479 Still, 
more work needs to be done, specifically in the arena of voter verification enhancements.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This study presents several key findings: 
 Voter fraud can exist due to established systemic weaknesses in the 
verification processes. 
 Ineligible voters may be voting; the potential exists. 
 It is impossible to ascertain the pervasiveness of voter fraud based upon 
the current tools used. 
 Increased transparency, comprehensive reporting, and scientific analysis 
are needed on voter registration list assessments. The public deserves 
complete election data and nonpartisan review. 
 Any degree of voter fraud may affect the outcome of elections or the 
confidence in them.  
 Uncertainty causes diminished confidence in elections.  
 Diminished confidence in elections erodes democracy. 
 A national voter registration database would enhance the ability to verify 
voter identity and eligibility, deterring voter fraud. 
                                                 
479 Election Assistance Commission, “Help America Vote Act.”  
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 The use of biometrics for voter identity verification can ensure knowing 
who is who and complement voter verification. 
 Biometrics is an innovative technology that could enable secure online 
voting opportunities. Biometric technologies could enhance participation. 
It is clear the United States needs to improve the registration verification process 
and boost information sharing across states and federal databases while streamlining the 
opportunity for citizens to vote, to have that vote counted, and simultaneously, protect the 
election process from fraud.480 This improvement can be achieved by using proven 
matching techniques and secure technology. Embedding the use of a national voter 
registration list and biometric technology into the voter verification program for elections 
can greatly enhance the integrity of elections and protect U.S. citizens’ right to vote, 
while protecting the privacy of voters.  
The implementation of a national voter registration list to improve accuracy and 
gain efficiencies, as well as the deployment of biometric capabilities for voter verification 
and ease of identification at the polling stations, will show the public the commitment to 
a sensitive program of state and national interest. It will demonstrate a quality registration 
list is essential and it will prove the value of ensuring accessibility to all citizens, while 
preventing fraud and reduce costs to local and state governments.  
The U.S. elections are now deemed critical infrastructure, which helps gain 
valuable protections against high-tech attacks.481 By safeguarding other vulnerable areas, 
the United States protects itself against non-technical, man-made threats as well. The 
continued investment towards election integrity and protection proves commitment to a 
program of vital interest. The real added value is stakeholder trust and confidence.  
Voter verification modernization enhances the ability to ensure all eligible voters 
are on the rolls and they will have no challenges with voting come Election Day. The 
new system must be sustainable, mitigate fraud, and reduce the burden on the voter. 
                                                 
480 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Voter Identification Requirements.” 
481 Election Assistance Commission, “Elections—Critical Infrastructure.”  
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Increasing voter verification within a state’s election process can prevent or mitigate 
voter identification fraud and multiple voting schemes in an effort to protect the right to 
vote better for U.S. citizens and enhance election integrity. The nation must do it smartly, 
however, by mitigating the burden on the voter to register, increasing public satisfaction, 
and promoting a belief in the legitimacy of the election outcome.  
Using a national voter registration list and biometric technology can go a long 
way to modernizing the voter registration process, preventing voter identify fraud, 
preventing the suppression for eligible voters, and moving towards a secure form of 
online voting. Online voting has been found to result “in more complete and accurate 
voter rolls.”482 Utilizing technology, such as biometrics and a national database, will not 
be able to shore up all vulnerabilities, most specifically human manipulation and 
corruption. Careful laws, policies, best practices, and enforcement of the laws must be in 
place to prevent these issues.  
The most important element in achieving credible and accepted elections 
is trust. Trust is achieved through transparency and inclusion. Notably all 
stakeholders must embrace inclusion and participate actively.483 
It is important to note that biometric technology cannot solve all problems with 
voter registration rates or voter turnout, and implementation may be challenging initially. 
It would take a number of years for a nation as large as the United States to adopt and 
implement a national voter registration database and a biometric system to enhance 
election integrity. Still, it appears to be a worthwhile investment. The Census Bureau 
anticipates the U.S. population will double by 2050. Implementing methods to verify 
individuals and their eligibility accurately will place the United States in a better position 
moving forward.  
                                                 
482 McCormack, Democracy Rebooted, 3. 
483 U.S. Agency International Development, “Biometrics in Elections,” 14. 
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B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Recommend state and local election officials mandate routine local and 
state audits, assessments, and reports on potential or confirmed voter fraud 
instances and how each instance was handled. 
 Recommend state and local election officials clear the way for researchers 
to have timely access to comprehensive voter registration list audit results. 
 Recommend states move to a national voter registration list as an 
immediate aid for increasing integrity, leveraging from shared systems, 
and saving monies. This move to such a list should be supported through 
federal legislation and managed by an appropriate agency.  
 Recommend election officials study using biometrics as a possible 
solution for voter verification, which mitigates the need for voter 
identification at the polls while paving the way forward for online voting.  
 Recommend REAL ID Act requirements for proof of U.S. citizenship 
status be expanded to meet the proof of citizenship used by Department of 
State for passport eligibility. 
 Recommend state election officials roundtable and develop a standard set 
of voter list data elements, formatting, and matching best practices as 
advised by NIST, so information could be placed in a national voter 
registration list. If no national list is adopted, this standardization could at 
least facilitate interoperability for lists to be shared across states and 
potentially with federal databases to enhance list maintenance.  
 Recommend all state vital birth records be made accessible to state and 
local election officials through ERIC and Crosscheck, or made 
interoperable with a national voter registration list. Ensure all state vital 
birth and death records be captured electronically in a timely manner with 
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either a scanner version of the certificates being available, or the location 
of a paper-copy be identified for further verification. 
 Recommend states provide REAL ID identification cards free for non-
drivers and copies of vital records free for those on state public benefits to 
ensure accessibility. Recommend REAL ID cards distinguish between 
citizens and non-citizens similar to requirements North Dakota established 
in its state code. 
 Recommend DHS USCIS enhance the SAVE program to ensure states can 
submit multiple identifiers for searching, to strengthen voter identity and 
eligibility verification, as well as allow batch processing to increase 
efficiencies, and as a result, build confidence in elections.  
 Recommend the DOJ routinely study and report on local, state, and federal 
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APPENDIX A  




Figure 5.  Voter Registration Survey Form. 
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APPENDIX B  
This appendix presents several tables of the responses to the state surveys. 
Table 8.   What Documents Are Required to Show Proof of in Terms of Age and 













DE1     
GA10  
HI13 See footnote. 
IA6  
ID3    
IL4   
KS5  








NY14 See footnote. 
RI12 See footnote. 









1 Delaware accepts any form of identification that confirms age and residency. 
Most of their voter registrations come from DMV, so a driver’s license is the 
most common form. Voters who have not provided ID at the time of registration 
must show ID at the polling place before voting. These names are marked on the 
poll list.  
2 Massachusetts applicants are required to provide certain information, just not 
show ID as noted in this question. Information regarding voter registration 
requirements can be found at the state website at: 
http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/eleifv/howreg.htm 
3
Proof of residency is only required for Election Day registration in Idaho. The 
state requires a photo ID and a document with name and residence address 
printed on it, such as a bank statement, utility bill, etc.  
4
Illinois may utilize the last four digits of individuals’ social security number, 
verify by utility bill, bank statement, paycheck or government check.  
5
In Kansas, registration is made with affirmation of eligibility, under penalty of 
perjury. 
6 In Iowa, no documents are required to register to vote using paper forms. 
7 Nebraska is the only state without any form of voter registration. 
8
In West Virginia, no ID is needed; the applicants must fill out the voter 
registration and sign it. 
9 In Wisconsin, no proof of age is required. Proof of residence must be shown 
using one of 12 types of documents permitted under the statutes. 
10 In Georgia, a multitude of documents may be presented when registering to vote. 
See O.C.G.A. 21-2-220 and O.C.G.A. 21-2-417. 
11 In Louisiana, [voter applicants] may use any documentation that establishes 
applicants’ identity, age, and residency. 
12 No response from Rhode Island on this question. 
13 In Hawaii, voters initially registering to vote by mail are required to submit an 
acceptable form of ID pursuant to 52 U.S.C. 21083. 
Pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statute (HRS) §11-15(a) Any person qualified to and 
desiring to register as a voter in any county shall make and subscribe to an 
application in the form of an affidavit. The affidavit shall contain the following 
information: 
(1) Name; 
(2) The applicant’s Hawaii driver’s license number or Hawaii state identification 
card number; provided that: 
 (a) If no driver’s license or identification card has been issued to the applicant, 
the last four digits of the applicant’s social security number; and 
 (b) If no social security number has been issued to the applicant, an election 
official or county clerk shall assign the applicant a unique identification number 
for voter registration purposes and enroll the applicant in the State’s 
computerized voter registration list, if any; 
(3) Date of birth; 
(4) Residence, including mailing address; 
(5) That the residence stated in the affidavit is not simply because of the person’s 
presence in the State, but that the residence was acquired with the intent to make 
Hawaii the person’s legal residence with all the accompanying obligations 
therein; and 
(6) That the person is a citizen. 
Note: The above section will be effective as of January 1, 2018. Should you wish 





Additionally, pursuant to HRS §11-15(b) the applicant shall swear to the truth of 
the allegations by self-subscribing affirmation in the affidavit on application for 
voter registration or other form prescribed by the chief election officer. Unless 
contested by a qualified voter, the clerk may accept, as prima facie evidence, the 
allegation of the applicant in information required in the affidavit in subsection 
(a)(5). In any other case where the clerk shall so desire or believe the same to be 
expedient, the clerk may demand that the applicant furnish substantiating 
evidence to the allegations of the applicant’s application. 
14 In New York State, an ID is needed only to verify the individuals are a person; 
not [used] to register. IDs need to be verified before first time voting. 











DE     
GA   
HI  
IA3 See footnote. 
ID  
IL  
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Footnotes: 
1 The State of Kansas has a list of 13 acceptable documents (www.gotvoterid.com). 
2 Utah verifies the individual’s social security number with the Driver License 
Division. 
3 In Iowa, citizenship is not verified except by oath when a voter registers. 
4 Nebraska utilizes a ND Driver’s License, a ND Non-Driver’s ID (offered free to 
anyone who does not have an ID), or a tribal ID from one of the tribes in North 
Dakota. The ID provided must provide name, current residential address, and date 
of birth. If the ID provided is not current or is missing one of these pieces of 
information, it may be supplemented by a current utility bill, a current bank 
statement, a check issued by a federal state or local government, a paycheck, or a 
document issued by a federal, state or local government. If not sufficient for any 
voter, these individuals may mark a ballot, which is then set aside until the 
individuals can provide the necessary ID or supplemental information if 
necessary. See NDCC § 16.1-01-04.1 (http://www.legis.nd.gov/cencode/t16-
1c01.pdf) for the specifics in the law.  
Table 10.   How Often does Your State Perform Statewide Voter Roll Maintenance 











GA4   
HI  
IA2 See footnote. 
ID  
IL  






























1 In Massachusetts, voter registration is maintained and updated by local 
election officials in each of the 351 municipalities. On a daily basis, they 
process voter registration applications, changes of address forms, delete voters 
who have confirmed in writing they no longer reside in the municipality, 
delete voters who have died, and remove voters who have registered to vote in 
another jurisdiction. The State Election Office maintains the physical database 
in which the voter records are stored and provides technical support to the 
local election officials. As part of that support, the State Office performs 
internal audits on the data including cross referencing with death records and 
running potential duplicate checks. The results are provided to the local 
election officials for verification and action, when appropriate.  
2 In Iowa, the frequency of maintenance depends on the type of maintenance 
(see Iowa Code 48A). 
3 Nebraska is the only state that does not register voters.  
4 
In Georgia, some processes (deceased voters, felons, mentally incompetent) 
are continuous. 
5 
Louisiana conducts an annual canvass of the rolls, plus maintenance is done 
anytime the state receives notice of a change in writing by the voter, by a place 
of return mail, by notice of registration in another state, and monthly for 
deaths and felons. 
6 
In Rhode Island, voter registration lists are continuously updated up until the 
voter registration deadline. 
7 
In Maryland, the state utilizes ERIC, deceased listings, address changes, and 
information from jury commissions to update the roster continuously. 











Mail Out Letters 
or Postcards 
DE     
GA     
HI     
IA8   
ID2    
IL3   
KS4      











Mail Out Letters 
or Postcards 
MA1   
MD     
MS      
MT     
ND9 See footnotes. 
NE7      
NJ5    
NY12   
RI11     
SC     
UT6     
VA     
WA     
WI      
WV  
WY   
Footnotes: 
1 In Massachusetts, each city and town conducts an annual, called the street listing. This census is mailed to 
every household, the results of which are the basis of the list maintenance process. Voters who fail to return 
their street listing is sent a confirmation notice and placed on the inactive voter list in accordance with the 
NVRA. Massachusetts has participated in CrossCheck, but found it unhelpful since most other jurisdictions are 
unwilling or unable to provide any further information that would be necessary to remove a voter from the list. 
Massachusetts is interested in participating in ERIC, but legislation is necessary, which is pending. 
2 Idaho state death lists and the list of individuals currently serving a felony conviction is used for maintenance. 
Counties also use jury list information, death notices, obituaries, etc. 
3 In Illinois, the local election authorities would make the final determination on voter status. 
4 Kansas uses additional databases, such as the Department of Vital Statistics, Department of Corrections, and 
the National Change of Address for registry maintenance. Additionally, it utilizes jury list notifications. 
5 In New Jersey, the Motor Vehicle Commission and court databases are also utilized to maintain the voter 
registry. 
6 In Utah, election officials receive information from Vital Statistics on death records. The prison systems send 
information on incarceration records. 
7 Nebraska also utilizes the National Change of Address list to maintain its voter registry. 
8 Iowa utilizes death records to maintain the voter list, and each county mails out letters or postcards to the 
voters. 
9 North Dakota is the only state without any form of voter registration.  
10 
Louisiana has access to CrossCheck; however, it has not acted on the data since joining ERIC. It connects with 
the federal social security administration’s database for verification. 
11 
Rhode Island utilizes voter registration database duplicate reports, and it also gains monthly reports from the 
RI Department of Health death records and the RI adult Correction Institution felon incarceration and release 
records. 
12 
New York State also utilizes Health Department death records, conviction records, and National Change of 
Address records. 
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Table 12.   What Occurs When a Non-citizen, an Individual Living in a Different 
State, or Otherwise Ineligible Person Is Detected and Confirmed during 









from the List 
DE  
GA6 See footnote. 
HI  
IA4 See footnote. 
ID2   
IL3  
KS    
LA7  
MA1 See footnote. 
MD    
MS   
MT    
ND5 See footnote. 
NE   
NJ   
NY   
RI    
SC   
UT  
VA   
WA    
WI   
WV   
WY9   
Footnotes: 
1 Massachusetts responded that this question was too 
difficult to answer as each scenario could have different 
procedures. If people indicated that they are not a citizen 
and they are registered to vote, it is usually the voters who 
asks to be removed as they did not realize they had 
registered. If voters have moved to another state, the only 
way they can be removed is if they confirm in writing they 
have moved or if they re-register in another jurisdiction 
and that jurisdiction notifies the local election officials of 
the previous residence. Massachusetts also receives notices 
of felony convictions, which they provide to the local 
election officials to remove any voters who are currently 
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incarcerated for a felony conviction. 
2 Verification is completed and then listings are turned over 
to the County Prosecutor for investigation. 
3 In Illinois, the county election authority would contact the 
individual, not the state. 
4 In Iowa, the voter is made inactive in most cases; however, 
non-citizenship is a different process than non-residency. 
5 
Nebraska is the only state without any form of voter 
registration.  
6 
In Georgia, different responses are possible, but some form 
of hearing or investigation is common. Voters are only 
removed in accordance with the law. 
7 
Louisiana also has a 2-part process with a 30-day pre-
challenge letter to notify the voters. If no action is taken, 
the 21-day challenge letter is issued. This letter notifies the 
individuals that they must appear and show cause why they 
should not be canceled when they receive information that 
they have moved and are registered to vote in another state. 
8 
In Rhode Island, the local BOCs investigate and may 
contact the voters if needed. If it is determined the 
individuals do not belong on the list, they may be removed. 
Possible criminal cases may be forwarded to the police for 
investigation. 
9 
In Wyoming, if an out-of-state cancellation is received, the 
voter is inactivated. 
10 
In Maryland, the individuals are given two weeks to 
respond; after that the individuals are removed from the 
roster.  
Table 13.   If Your State Offers Mail-In Registration and Mail-In Voting, Does 





to show ID 





















for my state. 
DE       
GA        
HI10 See footnote. 
IA4 See footnote. 
ID2 See footnote. 
IL        
KS3 
 
     
LA7 See footnote. 
MA1 
 






to show ID 





















for my state. 
MD      
MS        
MT        
ND5 See footnote. 
NE       
NJ       
NY11 See footnote. 
RI8 
 
      
SC       
UT        
VA9 
 
    
WA      
WI6 
 
      
WV       
WY        
Footnotes: 
1 Mail-in voter registration is required by NVRA. In Massachusetts, 
people applying by mail must include their driver’s license number 
and if they do not have a driver’s license, the last four digits of their 
social security number. If the ID number cannot be verified or the 
applicant states on the form that they do not have either ID, they are 
flagged to show identification the first time they vote. The 
requirement to show identification is printed on the 
acknowledgement notice they receive upon registering. 
2 In Idaho, if individuals validate against the DMV or SSA, they are 
not required to show photo ID before voting via a mail-in absentee 
ballot. 
3 In Kansas, people may also supply a driver’s license number or non-
driver identification number on the ballot application. The number 
will be verified before a ballot is issued. 
4 In Iowa, the voters must include a driver’s license number or social 
security number, which is then verified. 
5 Nebraska is the only state without any form of voter registration.  
6 
In Wisconsin, the voters submit a copy of the ID when first 
requesting an absentee ballot by mail. 
7 
In Louisiana, the voters are required to vote in person the first time 
to verify identity, either through a photo ID or voter ID affidavit. 
8 
In Rhode Island, voters are asked to provide driver’s license numbers 
and social security numbers prior to voting. A photo ID is required 
for in-person voting. If a mail in registrants vote by mail and does 
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not provide a driver’s license number or social security number, they 
must provide identification before their ballot is counted. 
9 
In Virginia, the voters could submit a copy of their ID with their 
absent voter ballot application as well. 
10 
In Hawaii, voters initially registering to vote by mail are required to 
submit an acceptable form of ID pursuant to 52 U.S.C. 21083. For 
mail-in voting, signatures on application documents and ballot return 
envelopes are compared against the signature contained in an 
authenticated document for the corresponding voter. 
11 
In New York State, first time registrants must have their IDs verified 
before voting. It can be accomplished in a number of ways. 
Table 14.   Who Prosecutes Voter Fraud in Your State? 
State County  State  Federal 
DE      
GA   
HI      
IA     
ID    
IL      
KS   
LA3   
MA1 See footnote. 
MD   
MS   




NE   
NJ     
NY     
RI4 See footnote. 
SC     
UT     
VA     
WA      
WI      
WV    
WY      
 
Footnotes: 
1 In Massachusetts, the state attorney general, 
the district attorney, or the U.S. attorney 
could prosecute violations of election law. 
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2 Georgia elections are generally regulated by 
the State Board of Elections (SEB). The SEB 
is the usual source of sanctions (civil 
penalties only) for election violations, but 
violations may also be prosecuted in county 
and federal court. It is rare for criminal 
prosecutions to occur, but it happens in some 
cases. 
3 In Louisiana, the County District Attorney 
generally prosecutes voter fraud. The DA 
may recuse to the Attorney General. If the 
election is federal, the person may be 
federally prosecuted.  
4 In Rhode Island, investigations are conducted 
by local boards of canvassers/Board of 
Elections and any case of voter fraud is 
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APPENDIX C  
This appendix shows the status of compliance with the REAL ID Act by state. 
Table 15.   Status of Compliance for Real ID Act. 
State REAL ID Act State Status 
(https://www.dhs.gov/real-id) 
Difference between citizen 
and non-citizen card?  
YES, NO, or unknown 
AK Extension  unknown 
AL Compliant  unknown 
AR Compliant  unknown 
AZ Compliant  unknown 
CA Extension  unknown 
CO Compliant  unknown 
CT Compliant  unknown 












IL Under Review for Extension 
 unknown 
IN Compliant  unknown 
KS Compliant 
 unknown 
KY Extension  unknown 




MD Compliant  unknown 
ME Extension  unknown 
MI Under Review for Extension  unknown 
MN Extension  unknown 
MO Under Review for Extension  unknown 
MS Compliant  unknown 
MT Extension  unknown 
NC Compliant  unknown 
ND Extension Yes 
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State REAL ID Act State Status 
(https://www.dhs.gov/real-id) 
Difference between citizen 
and non-citizen card?  
YES, NO, or unknown 
NE Compliant 
 unknown 
NH Extension  unknown 
NJ Extension  unknown 
NM Compliant  unknown 
NV Compliant  unknown 
NY Under Review for Extension 
 unknown 
OH Compliant  unknown 
OK Extension  unknown 
OR Extension  unknown 
PA Extension  unknown 
RI Compliant 
 unknown 
SC Extension  unknown 
SD Compliant  unknown 
TN Compliant  unknown 
TX Compliant  unknown 
UT Compliant  unknown 
VA Extension  unknown 
VT Compliant  unknown 





WY Compliant  unknown 
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